

JPRS-UPS-84-040

2 May 1984

USSR Report

POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA

No. 6, November-December 1983



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No. 6, November-December 1983

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language bimonthly journal *NARODY AZII I AFRIKI*, published in Moscow by the Oriental Studies Institute and the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PUBLICATION DATA

English title : THE PEOPLES OF ASIA AND AFRICA
No 6, November-December 1983

Russian title : NARODY AZII I AFRIKI

Author (s) :

Editor (s) : A. A. Kutsenkov

Publishing House : Izdatel'stvo Nauka

Place of Publication : Moscow

Date of Publication : November-December 1983

Signed to press : 16 November 1983

Copies : 3,520

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Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy
literatury, 1983

ENGLISH SUMMARIES OF MAJOR ARTICLES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 214-216

[Text] Historical Experience of Bolshevism and Revolutionary Democracy of Afro-Asian Countries

A. V. Kiva, P. M. Shastitko

The significance of the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party lies in the fact that it constituted a new strategic line in the development of the international working class movement. It brought together the revolutionary forces of Russia on the basis of ideological, political and organizational principles elaborated by V. I. Lenin. Bolshevism was the outcome of the revolutionary movement not only in Russia but also in neighboring countries enslaved by imperialism. Actual tasks confronting laborers in the East and West and the approach to the world revolutionary process as a single whole found their expression in Bolshevism.

Analysis of the influence of Bolshevism in the zone of the national liberation movement requires a dialectic approach. There are many theses borrowed by non-proletarian revolutionaries of the zone of the national liberation movement from Bolshevism, the Marxism of the modern era. This applies above all to party construction. Champions of liberation, prepared to wage an armed struggle, had the benefit of the example of colonialism's defeat in Russia by means of an effective weapon, i.e. Bolshevism; they were attracted to Marxism-Leninism rather by intuition than consciously. They took it as a revolutionary method, although they did not share many of its principles. Only the most advanced of them eventually chose scientific socialism.

The article examines the impact of Bolshevik principles upon the evolution of progressive parties, both in direct and indirect form. The best illustration of this evolution is provided by the case of less developed colonies and semi-colonies (from the standpoint of social and class development), which won independence mainly in the 1960's and 1970's.

The article emphasizes that the movement of various countries toward socialism can proceed along different roads. Historically, however, the existence of a revolutionary party of a new type is binding upon all.

The Organization of African Unity: Topical Problems

Ja. Ja. Etinger

The article sums up two decades of activities by the Organization of African Unity, the largest regional organization in the developing world. The author emphasizes a significant positive role played by the OAU in the establishment and development of political, economic and cultural cooperation among the liberated African nations. At the same time the article analyzes difficulties and complications of the last years in the functioning of the OAU, caused by objective and subjective factors. The author directs attention to the subversive activities of the United States and other Western states seeking to split the OAU and to eliminate the military anti-imperialist and progressive substance of its policy. The article also highlights the struggle of the progressive forces of Africa to maintain the OAU and its anti-imperialist course, directed at the final eradication of colonialism and racism on the continent, the consolidation of political independence and the achievement of economic independence by the newly liberated countries.

Cooperation of USSR and Korean People's Democratic Republic at Present Stage

V. I. Melnikov, A. T. Muratov

The article appraises the Soviet-Korean cooperation over the past 35 years. The achievement of the DPRK in socioeconomic development bear witness to the fact that under socialism an erstwhile backward country, using the experience of fraternal socialist states and enjoying the disinterested aid and all-round support of these states, can make progress in economic, cultural and political development. The article deals with various aspects of Soviet-Korean cooperation: Soviet aid in establishing a material and technical base, personnel training, the development of scientific exchange and trade, joint activity in the international arena and the development of Soviet-Korean cultural ties.

Industrial Trade Unions in Algeria and Guinea

I. Yu. Yusupov

In countries advancing along capitalist lines, social mobilization for economic progress is of crucial importance. It is most effective when practiced through trade unions. The article examines this problem with special reference to Algeria and Guinea. It deals with trade unions operating in public and private sectors.

According to "The Charter of Management of Socialist Enterprises," white- and blue-collar employees of Algerian state enterprises elect labor assemblies (on the basis of trade-union membership), which are assigned the task of management supervision. In Guinea on the basis of "The Charter of Production and Productivity" grass-root trade union organizations are engaged in planning and supervising, although to a much more limited extent. In both countries trade unions further the eradication of illiteracy, professional training and labor discipline.

The trade unions of Algeria protect the workers' rights whenever a social conflict arises. These conflicts are inevitable due to the very nature of the public sector of these states, where the employer is a non-proletarian state. The complete integration of trade unions in the state and party structure rules out strikes within the public sector, as is the case in Guinea.

The article analyzes the trade unions, problems relating to organizational weakness, disagreements and bureaucracy within the trade-union leadership and an overt, or rather a covert, confrontation on the part of the management of public enterprises.

The article presents evidence of the enhancement of the private sector in Algeria in 1969-79. The higher wages it offers not only drain state enterprises of qualified labor but adversely affect worker unity. The article offers data on strikes held at Algerian private enterprises. The experience demonstrates that even when the law guarantees the trade union's rights it is not easy to supervise the activity of private entrepreneurs to see that they fulfill their duties.

Communist Party of India During Second World War

P. V. Kutsobin

The article examines the attitude toward World War II of various Indian class and political forces with special reference to the policy of the Communist Party of India (CPI).

At the initial stage of World War II the CPI, together with the Indian National Congress and other organizations, took an active part in antiwar campaigns. It put forward the slogan of "turning an imperialist war into a revolutionary one" and considered mass mobilization to reinforce the anti-imperialist struggle and, taking advantage of the war and the British setback at the front, to achieve full independence as its main task.

When fascist Germany invaded the USSR the sympathy of the Indian communists was with the Soviet Union and other countries which had fallen victim to the Nazi aggression. The article traces the formation of the CPI position vis-a-vis the war. It notes that the party ran its activity not only as an international force but as a patriotic organization, which was tackling the task of combining the support of the military efforts of the Allies with the fight for Indian liberation. Although at times the tactics of the CPI included flaws, this does not modify the general picture. The communists were the most militant and revolutionary force in the Indian national liberation movement. Taking a correct stand during World War II, they made a significant contribution to the attainment of political independence.

Uganda: Period of Military Dictatorship

V. P. Pankratyev

Military rule in Uganda lasted 8 years. During this period the regime went through several stages, ranging from consolidation to weakening and collapse.

The article demonstrates the modifications of the economic policy of I. Amin, both at home and in the international arena, which ranged from playing with foreign capital to repressing it.

The article analyzes the main steps taken by the military government and reaches the conclusion that the military leaders were incompetent and unable to stick to their commitments.

Common Ethnic and Cultural Background of East Turkestan and Central Asia

B. A. Litvinsky

The fact that, historically, East Turkestan and Central Asia had much in common was underlined by N. Ya. Bichurin, V. V. Grigoryev and V. V. Bartold. Later on, archaeological excavations carried out in these regions substantiated this thesis. The evidence of written documents (in various languages) found in East Turkestan fundamentally changed the whole picture, which had been based on Chinese sources.

We came to know that independent states emerged and developed in East Turkestan. It was much later, in the Han period, especially between 108 B.C. and 170 A.D., and in the T'ang period (630-circa 741) that the Chinese troops used to invade East Turkestan. Each time, however, they were forced to leave.

In the ancient period East Turkestan was inhabited by an Indo-European population, the bulk of which were Tacharians, Sakas of Khotan, Sogdians and Indians. In the Middle Ages some Turkish and Mongol-speaking waves (Turks, Uighurs, Karluks, Mongols, etc.) settled here. All these people had their own polity and culture and kept close ties with tribes and peoples of Central Asia, South Siberia, Mongolia, Tibet, to some extent, and China, to a much lesser one.

The comparison of East Turkestan and Central Asian archaeological, historical, ethnographic, anthropological and architectural data testifies that in the ancient and medieval period both regions had similar economic models and common characteristics. This emphasizes the significance of the fact that both Central Asia and East Turkestan used to belong to many states. Consequently, it could be suggested that the common ethnic, cultural and historical background of Central Asia and East Turkestan was a dominant constant throughout their history.

Problems of History of Oriental Literatures

Ye. P. Chelyshev, V. I. Braginsky, N. I. Prigarina, V. S. Sementsov, A. A. Suvorova

The article deals with the problems which are common to the evolution of the literary process in the East from the ancient period to the present in connection with the publication of a series of monographs entitled "Histories of Literature of the Peoples of the East." The "East" in the article signifies the historical and cultural entity of three regions (the Middle East, South

and Southeast Asia and the Far East), characterized by the correlation of tradition and innovation which substantially differs from that in the West. The correlation in the East presupposes the evolution of forms of social consciousness along the lines of the medieval pattern until the 19th century. The article offers definitions of the concepts of areal, regional and national Oriental literatures and examines their study during four historical and literary epochs: ancient, medieval, new and modern. It tackles the origin of literature and its early functions, the formation of canonical literary systems in the Middle Ages and their peculiarities, characteristics of the transitional period to the new times and specific features of the Enlightenment in the East, as well as realistic, modernist and traditionalist trends in modern Oriental literatures.

Russian Sinologist De Ming, His 'Journey to China' and Excerpts Translated from 'The Dream in the Red Chamber'

V. E. Bograd, V. L. Riftin

The article attempts to decipher the pseudonym of a Russian Chinese scholar of the first half of the 19th century, who wrote a series of articles entitled "Journey to China" (published in OTCHESTVENNYE ZAPISKI in 1841-43) and translated the first chapter of "The Dream in the Red Chamber," the most famous Chinese novel of the 18th century.

The article maintains that De Ming was the pen-name of A. I. Kovanko, a mining engineer who visited China with a Russian religious mission and stayed in Peking from 1830 to 1836. His essays, which were of great interest to the Russian reader and were acclaimed by V. G. Belinsky, constitute, in all probability, the first report on unofficial China in Russia. It gave an insight into the mores of a Peking street, officials taking bribes, the weakness of the Ching monarchy and the army on the eve of the Opium Wars.

On the basis of the archive documents found by the authors (notably, two reports by A. I. Kovanko), the article reconstructs his biography and analyzes his translation of "The Dream in the Red Chamber." The article suggests that the chapter of "The Dream in the Red Chamber," translated and published by A. I. Kovanko, represents the first attempt to translate this novel into a foreign language.

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CSO: 1812/114-E

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Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) p 213

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CSO: 1807/122

BOLSHEVIK INFLUENCE ON AFRO-ASIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENTS EXAMINED

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 3-11

[Article by A. V. Kiva and P. M. Shastitko: "The Historic Bolshevik Experience and the Revolutionary Democrats of Afro-Asian Countries (Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDRP Congress)"]

[Excerpts] The theoretical interpretation of each revolutionary party's experience in struggle is the invaluable property of the world liberation movement. It represents an important condition for the continued development of the liberation struggle and validates the chosen course. The experience of Soviet Communists is particularly rich and multidimensional. V. I. Lenin, discussing the international significance of the experience of the October Socialist Revolution and "interpreting international significance to mean the international import or historical inevitability of the international repetition of our own experience," wrote that "this significance must be attached to several basic features of our revolution."¹ Above all, the creation of a new type of party in Russia was of colossal significance for the struggle of national liberation forces. This party took organizational form in 1903. As the CPSU Central Committee Decree "On the 80th Anniversary of the Second RSDRP [Russian Social Democratic Workers' Party] Congress" says, "a new type of party entered the historical arena--a party of the working class, a party of scientific communism and a party of socialist revolution and communist construction."² The formation of this kind of party is a "historical inevitability" for classes and social groups declaring a serious intention to build a new society in which people will not exploit others. Guided by the Russian experience, interpreting it theoretically, enriching it and comparing it to the features and traditions of their own countries and the current international situation, revolutionaries develop party doctrine, strengthen party ranks and improve the functioning of their party. The role of the party in the workers and national liberation movements, in the assumption of power, in the consolidation of revolutionary achievements and, finally, in socioeconomic reforms and the construction of a new society is a cardinal point in the ideological debates and political battles between real revolutionaries and reformists.

Parties representing means of political struggle were engendered by the bourgeoisie when this emerging class began to attack the citadels of feudalism. As the bourgeoisie matured and then grew too old, however, its parties

gradually became a means of holding on to power that was slipping away, of engineering political intrigues and of deceiving the masses. The working class represented a new system of societal relations. When it appeared on the political stage, became aware of its class interests and sensed its strength and its ability to take power away from the bourgeoisie in order to build a society of freedom and social justice, it had to form a fundamentally new political organization, capable of leading the masses into class battles for the eradication of all classes. The creation of a new type of party became a historical necessity for the working class and a historical inevitability for the social progress of all mankind.

The people of the colonies and semicolonies saw Bolshevik Russia as their protector. The young Soviet country, ravaged by civil war and the intervention of imperialist powers, offered political and moral support to people fighting against colonialism and for national independence and social progress and even gave them as much material assistance as it could, including weapons. The people of Afghanistan, Turkey, Mongolia and several other countries are well aware of this.

The theories which contradicted Bolshevism but called themselves socialist were completely discredited in the eyes of the laboring masses of the colonies and semicolonies. They realized that the reformist type of social-democratic party assuming power in their mother countries, as well as the promoters of these theories, were pursuing the same kind of imperialist policy as the bourgeois parties.

Under the guidance of the Bolshevik party created by V. I. Lenin, people in the Soviet country were successful in solving problems that were exceptionally pertinent to the colonial people: Within an amazingly short period of time, unparalleled in history, the people of the former colonial periphery of defunct tsarist Russia, who had acquired the right of self-determination but were also part of a family of free and equal peoples, put an end to their age-old backwardness, accomplished a cultural revolution and permanently eradicated poverty, destitution and almost universal illiteracy.

It is a well-known fact that these radical socioeconomic and cultural changes in the new Russia made a colossal impression on the leaders of the national liberation movement and on cultural figures and members of the intelligentsia in the former colonies and semicolonies. "When the rest of the world was being strangled by the vise of depression and was regressing in some areas," wrote, for example, J. Nehru, the great son of the Indian people, "a great new world was being created in the Soviet nation before our very eyes. Following the great Lenin's instructions, Russia looked into the future and thought only of how things should be, while other countries lay crushed by the dead hand of the past and wasted their energy on the preservation of useless relics of the past. I personally was greatly impressed by the reports of the great successes in underdeveloped regions of Central Asia under Soviet rule. For this reason, I ultimately was wholeheartedly on Russia's side; the existence and example of the Soviet Union were a bright and joyful event in a dark and gloomy world."⁹

Obviously, the Bolshevik influence in the zone of the national liberation movement must be examined from the dialectical standpoint. The national liberation

movement, which was bourgeois-democratic by its social nature, could not develop exclusively under the banner of a proletarian ideology. Bolshevism often had a strong influence on the national liberation movement and its leaders by virtue of its consistent anticolonialism and antiracism, its genuine humanitarianism and its convincing experience and tremendous success in the emancipation and thorough development of previously backward people in the nation of soviets. The example set by the people of the USSR, who had thrown off the chains of national and social slavery, called the people of the English, French, Portuguese and other colonies to battle and proved that colonial oppression could be eradicated now that the world imperialist system had already been weakened by the loss of Russia and now that the leading capitalist powers were being torn apart by conflicts.

At the same time, non-proletarian revolutionaries in the zone of the national liberation movement adopted several of the premises of Bolshevik ideological principles. Above all, this applied to party organization, but not only to this. Fighters in the dependent countries, who were prepared to wage an armed struggle for freedom, were drawn to Marxism-Leninism--more intuitively than consciously--because they saw it as a revolutionary method, although they did not agree with many of its premises, including the most fundamental ones. The Bolshevik influence eventually led the more progressive members of the national liberation movement to scientific socialism.

The influence of Bolshevik principles on the evolution of progressive parties is clearly illustrated by the liberation struggle of the 1920's, the liberation movements of the 1930's and 1940's and, finally, the national-democratic parties formed in the former colonies and semicolonies when most of these won their independence in the 1960's and 1970's. In virtually each country, the struggle for national independence was initially headed by the national front type of party (or political organization)--a party-movement. These were mass parties which could be joined by the entire population. On the one hand, conditions demanded the unification of all healthy forces interested in the eradication of colonial domination. Their opponent was colonialism. This was a strong, experienced, sly and subtle opponent, and its defeat required unification under the banner of the liberation struggle. This is why the party-movement was naturally broad-based in terms of its ethnic, tribal and social composition. Its ideology had to be accessible and acceptable to the most diverse population strata, most of which were illiterate and were strongly influenced by tradition. The organizational principles of the party and the methods of its functioning were planned accordingly. Regardless of the political views of its leaders, when they set party objectives they had to consider the specific stage of the struggle and the fact that socially and politically diverse forces, distinguished by different levels of political awareness and cultural development, had to be united for the common cause of struggle against colonialism. In addition to this, the situation was often complicated by ethnic and religious differences. Only in isolated cases (primarily when the liberation struggle was headed by Marxist-Leninists or political forces close to them) were the mobilizing factors of nationalism and religion replaced by the ideals of patriotism, social justice and so forth.

Many progressive leaders believed that the party-movement, which united virtually the entire adult population, excluding direct agents of the colonizers

and collaborationists, would later, after the assumption of power by the people, serve as the best guarantee against all types of unexpected political developments and attempts to change the existing order by force. When socio-economic reforms began to be carried out after the achievement of political independence, however, the ruling party was required to exert a positive influence on social processes and unite its ranks on a different basis, as these reforms were injuring the interests of many of the diverse class forces that had previously taken part in the nationwide struggle. These injuries grew more serious as the reform process progressed. For this reason, a new ideological and political platform was required to clarify the social goals of the struggle, and this called for a revolutionary-democratic platform reflecting increasing similarities to scientific socialism.

In many cases, however, the radical reorganization of the party-movements with the aim of correspondence to the new objectives of new regimes either took too long or was only accomplished in part. Sometimes loud rallies, demonstrations and the glorification of party (or government) leaders were used as a substitute for thorough and painstaking daily work. Many of these parties never undertook the mobilization of workers, peasants, employees and craftsmen for an energetic and conscious struggle for socialist ideals and never took any effective steps to make them energetic and conscious builders of a new life. During the new stage of struggle, when the emphasis was shifted from the national to the social sphere, the inertia of the previous stage of the national liberation movement was still in effect. Some leaders of young states had not clarified their own positions, were hesitant in making decisions and were sometimes contented with vague, sweeping social programs. This naturally affected the nature of the party. Besides this, there was often a tendency, sometimes quite strong, toward authoritarianism, toward the autocratic management of government and party affairs and toward "massophobia" on the part of some leaders, stemming from their "military origins" and their reluctance to cede power to the political parties which they themselves had created but which would be of a class nature.

Organizational weaknesses and vague ideological and political positions kept some national-democratic parties from conducting the purposeful ideological indoctrination of the masses and effectively opposing ideologies hostile to social progress. In essence, they were not ruling parties in the full sense of the term: Their activity did not extend to many spheres of life and was sometimes superficial and formal. When serious political crises arose and when the class struggle became more intense as a result of the continuous progress of the national-democratic revolution, parties of this kind were ineffective and were often defeated. The national democrats became obsolete in several countries. This was true, for example, of the Convention People's Party in Ghana, the Sudanese Union in Mali, the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt and some others.

The mass party-movements which were unable to perform a leading role in the new society had defects other than organizational weaknesses. After uniting virtually the entire adult population, both supporters and opponents of the socialist orientation (which certainly complicated the compilation of a definite ideological and political platform), they were difficult to manage and did not give the masses clear instructions on future struggle.

The main weakness of these parties, however, was that after they had resolved to accomplish the radical reorganization of society on the basis of social progress (leaving aside the question of the degree to which their interpretation of socialism was close to its scientific meaning), they adopted most of their organizational principles and tactics and some of their ideological and political bases from Western, essentially reformist, social-democratic parties. Experience had already proved, however, that reformism, including the national-democratic variety, was inadequate as a means of carrying out radical reforms.

The lessons learned from the failures of some national-democratic parties appear to have promoted the quicker formation of progressive revolutionary-democratic parties, uniting the most politically active and aware segments of the population, making a choice in favor of socialism and generally declaring scientific socialism to be their theoretical basis. This process became more intense in the late 1960's and early 1970's, when parties of this kind came into being in democratic Yemen and the People's Republic of the Congo, and was even more fully developed in the 1970's, when revolutionary-democratic parties were formed in Benin, Angola and Mozambique and when a revolutionary labor party began to take shape in Ethiopia.

It would obviously be wrong to deny the sometimes noticeable differences between these revolutionary-democratic parties: They had different originating sources, operational conditions and leadership principles.

Even today there are party-movements, national-democratic parties which are just as mass-based as they were during the struggle for political independence and are trying to manage society in non-capitalist ways, although this entails great difficulties. This is true, for example, of the Revolutionary Party of Tanzania (CCM). Although these parties have remained mass-based and essentially nationwide, they are trying to strengthen their ranks with an efficient organizational structure and the creation of a fairly large and well-trained party aktiv connected with the masses; they have been able to define their ideological and political positions more precisely and to rid themselves of elements openly hostile to the socialist option. But the countries ruled by these parties are still undergoing the initial stages of non-capitalist development. The intensification of the class struggle as a result of progress in this direction and the institution of more radical socioeconomic reforms will probably necessitate the conversion of even these party-movements into progressive parties of the laboring public--revolutionary-democratic parties choosing scientific socialism as their ideology.

Ruling national-democratic parties with a broad social base and a nationwide organization are also managing society effectively in such countries as, for example, Zambia, Burundi, Mali and others. But although these parties have rejected capitalism as an option for the future development of their countries, they still have not made a final choice in favor of socialism.

The prevailing tendency is precisely that experience itself, the laws of social development and the logic of class struggle necessitate the creation of revolutionary parties in the countries with a socialist orientation, parties based on the principles of democratic centralism, guided in their activities by the

main principles of scientific socialism and serving as the directing and managing force in society. This reaffirms the immutable historic significance of Bolshevism for all revolutionary forces of the planet, particularly in the zone of the national liberation movement: Only the adoption of the ideological and organizational principles worked out by the CPSU will make revolutionary parties stronger and more able to direct the accomplishment of profound social changes.

Several specific examples can be used to illustrate this tendency.

Marxist-Leninist parties are now being formed in a number of countries with a socialist orientation. At the First Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (December 1977), at which time the creation of a Marxist-Leninist party--a working-class party--in the country was announced, A. Neto, outstanding son of the Angolan people, stressed that "the working class exercises its political power through a party. This is a directing and organizing force; it is the nucleus of power. The political power of the working class and the authority of the socialist state cannot exist without the guidance of a Marxist-Leninist party."¹⁰

The FRELIMO program adopted at the third party congress (February 1977) says: "FRELIMO united workers, peasants, soldiers, the revolutionary intelligentsia and other laboring people, tempered in the struggle against human exploitation and for the triumph of the interests of the popular masses, in a voluntary and militant alliance based on scientific socialism. The party is the guiding force of the state and the Mozambique society. The theoretical and ideological basis of its activity and development consists of the revolutionary experience of the Mozambican people and Marxism-Leninism."¹¹ One of the primary objectives of this stage was the construction of a revolutionary party, and the working class was declared "the leading class in the historical process." Explaining the nature of the FRELIMO party, one of its leaders, J. Quatorze, remarked during a roundtable discussion conducted by the editors of PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA that in Mozambique FRELIMO is not called a working-class party "because this definition would not reflect the actual state of affairs. FRELIMO...is the vanguard party of the laboring classes. During the progression toward socialism, the working class will develop, grow, raise the level of its class consciousness and thereby play a more decisive role within FRELIMO. But it is absolutely obvious that a party calling itself Marxist-Leninist must fight for the social goals and interests of the working class from the very beginning--regardless of how strong its influence might be at the given moment."¹²

Mengistu Haile-Mariam, leader of the Ethiopian revolution, said something interesting about the revolutionary party: "It is the function of a revolutionary party to unite the laboring people and mobilize them for a struggle against exploiter classes in order to take power into their own hands and build a just and prospering society, free of human exploitation."¹³ He stressed the importance of the theoretical arming of party members and of the creative application of Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of the world communist and workers movement to the specific conditions of Ethiopia.

This is the new type of revolutionary party--a vanguard party armed with the ideology of scientific socialism. This is also an important stage in the evolution of the revolutionary-democratic party into a Marxist-Leninist party. This process was once undergone by the now Marxist-Leninist parties in Mongolia, Cuba and other countries.¹⁴

V. I. Lenin said that the class nature of a party depended primarily on its social composition and on "its leaders and the purpose of its actions and its political tactics."¹⁵ Most of the parties we have discussed are led by revolutionaries who are familiar with the principles of scientific socialism. They view Marxist-Leninists and communists as their comrades-in-arms in the class struggle. When they make the transition to a platform based on the ideology of scientific socialism and choose to cooperate closely with Marxist-Leninist parties, these parties set and attain objectives which indisputably transcend revolutionary-democratic boundaries. For example, the charter of the MPLA Party of Labor obligates each party member to study Marxist-Leninist theory regularly, to implement this theory, to constantly strengthen the organizational and ideological unity of the party, to set an example in labor, to actively and consciously defend the interests of workers and peasants and the people's government and to help the party teach the laboring public the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.¹⁶ The charters of FRELIMO and the Yemeni Socialist Party make approximately the same demands on their members.

Other evidence of the differences between the activities of these revolutionary parties and the conventional form of revolutionary democracy can be found in the system of party personnel training. For example, students in the national party school of the People's Republic of the Congo study, in addition to the history of the Congolese Labor Party (PCT) and the geography of their own country, scientific communism, Marxist-Leninist philosophy, socialist political economics, the history of the international revolutionary movement, the history of the CPSU and the theory and practice of party construction. Party schools in several other countries with a socialist orientation have similar curricula.

Official statistics in the countries with a socialist orientation are still poorly organized and, unfortunately, there is not enough information about the social composition of these parties. But even available data are indicative. For example, workers and employees on the lowest level account for 55 percent of the approximately 7,000 members of the PCT, the revolutionary intelligentsia accounts for 22 percent, peasants account for 14 percent and servicemen account for 9 percent.¹⁷ Around 45 percent of the members of the MPLA Party of Labor (in 1982 the party had around 30,000 members) are workers engaged directly in production.¹⁸

According to party activists, the process by which ruling parties evolve into parties of scientific socialism is far from over in the countries of revolutionary democracy; it is still going on. The leaders of the Yemeni Socialist Party, for example, believe that the present state of the YSP, its level of development, its achievements and its current difficulties correspond to the stage of the revolution in their country--namely, the national-democratic

stage.¹⁹ It seems to us that ruling parties in the countries with a socialist orientation should be regarded as parties of the laboring public in the sense that they (1) consist mainly or exclusively of members of the laboring masses, (2) reflect the interests of urban and rural laborers and (3) arm themselves with the ideology of scientific socialism. At the same time, these are not completely proletarian parties in terms of their composition, structure, experience and political awareness, but parties making the transition from revolutionary-democratic to Marxist-Leninist. It is obvious, however, that a great deal has been accomplished during the course of their evolution into proletarian parties. The main thing is that these parties of the laboring public, which lead the struggle for socialism in countries with a socialist orientation, view the transition to Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism--that is, the principles of scientific socialism--as the only realistic way of attaining their goals.

The historic significance of any event or process in the life of mankind depends on the strength and duration of its influence on people. The ideas of the Second RSDRP Congress and the birth of Bolshevism are still having a multidimensional, strong and beneficial effect on the development of the world liberation movement and on the entire 20th century. Lenin's teachings about the construction of socialism and the experience of their implementation in the USSR and other socialist countries were and are a reliable point of reference for all revolutionary forces in the world. Lenin's party is broadening its ties with revolutionary-democratic parties strengthening their own positions in the anti-imperialist struggle and in the construction of a new life in their countries. The ideological and political convergence of many of these parties with the communist movement reflects the major changes that took place in the past and are taking place now under the influence of the ideas and practice of Leninism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The solidarity of the CPSU and all communists with these parties is an important condition for the expansion and intensification of the world revolutionary process.

Revolutionaries in all countries justifiably believe that loyalty to the traditions of the Second RSDRP Congress is loyalty to Lenin's teachings about the party and a necessary condition for successful struggle. Different countries can take different roads to socialism, but the presence of a revolutionary party of the Leninist type is a historically necessary condition for the success of this journey.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 41, p 3.
2. KOMMUNIST, 1983, No 6, p 3.
9. J. Nehru, "Autobiography," Moscow, 1955, p 304.
10. PRAVDA, 6 December 1977.
11. "Dokumenty partii FRELIMO Narodnoy Respubliki Mozambik" [Documents of the FRELIMO Party of the People's Republic of Mozambique], Moscow, 1980, p 206.

12. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1982, No 3, p 36.
13. Quoted in: Ye. Denisov and V. Sharayev, "A Vanguard Party Is Being Built in Ethiopia," AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, 1980, No 11, p 12.
14. For more detail, see P. M. Shastitko, "Leninskaya teoriya natsional'no-kolonial'nogo voprosa (istoriya formirovaniya)" [Lenin's Theory of the National-Colonial Question (History of Its Origins)], Moscow, 1979; A. V. Kiva, "Strany sotsialisticheskoy orientatsii: osnovnyye tendentsii razvitiya" [Basic Trends in the Development of Countries with a Socialist Orientation], Moscow, 1978.
15. V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., vol 41, p 261.
16. JOURNAL DE ANGOLA, 19 December 1978.
17. KOMMUNIST, 1980, No 3, p 94.
18. PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA, 1982, No 3, p 35.
19. Ibid., No 8, p 49.

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INTRA-AFRICAN DISAGREEMENTS HAMPER OAU'S EFFECTIVENESS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 12-22

[Article by Ya. Ya. Etinger: "The Organization of African Unity: Current Problems"]

[Excerpts] When we point out the OAU's important contribution to the development of the African people's national liberation movement, we must also note the serious difficulties that arose in the organization's activity in recent years. There were different reasons for this--internal and external. The difficulties are primarily the result of differences in the socioeconomic and political orientation of OAU members: Some are taking the revolutionary-democratic road of development, while capitalist relations have been established in others.⁴ Different levels of economic development in these countries, their differing economic interests, cultural and historical traditions and religious beliefs, and the differences of opinion between some Arab members of the OAU and the countries of Tropical Africa have also had an effect. Until recently, odious dictatorships also impeded unity in some countries (Uganda, the Central African Republic and Equatorial Guinea). The cohesion of African countries has been inhibited by the growth of nationalism in some states, the intensification of centrifugal tendencies in some countries and regions and the expansionist aims of some political regimes. Internal unrest, coups and counter coups have not contributed to the stability of the African community.

The OAU charter and its declared principles are the result of compromises reached by states which had split into two groups before 1963: the radical, anti-imperialist Casablanca group and the conservative, pro-Western Monrovia group. These compromises, which colored most of the OAU's subsequent activity, were made necessary by the characteristics of the first stage of the national liberation movement in Africa, when the most important thing on the agenda was the struggle against colonialism. Most of the OAU's present members were under colonial rule at the time when the organization was founded. During the next stage--the stage for the resolution of socioeconomic problems during the intensification of the national liberation movement--the differing domestic and foreign policy interests of various countries became more evident and sometimes came into conflict. The situation in the OAU was naturally affected by the worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism. The African states were drawn to one or the other socioeconomic system by the force of

their chosen course of socioeconomic development, and this has naturally affected their views on present and future inter-African relations.

Immediately after the birth of the OAU, the anti-imperialist line of the states which had chosen the course of progressive development was resisted by those advocating the maintenance of close economic, political and even military relations with the West. This intensified the polarization of political forces and related differences of opinion in the OAU, complicating or precluding the pursuit of a common policy on various important issues. The OAU's avoidance, often deliberate, of the resolution and even the discussion of some particularly pressing problems was indicative. Of course, the OAU can take credit for some success in its mediating efforts in conflicts between organization members, such as the conflicts between Sudan and Ethiopia. The OAU tries to prevent disputes between its members but does not have enough united will for the implementation of decisions.

One of the OAU's weaknesses stems from the absence of a political mechanism for the organization of quick and effective action in response to conflicts between African states. This kind of action would be of exceptional importance, however, because conflicts of this kind intensify international political instability in various regions and on the continent as a whole.

Certain differences of opinion between some Muslim Arab countries in North Africa and the states of Tropical Africa have come to light in recent years; this was most clearly reflected in their different approaches to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, which was caused by the Somali regime's nationalist attempt to change established borders in the Horn of Africa. Whereas one group, which supported Somalia in one way or another, was guided primarily by the concept of pan-Islamic solidarity, the other group, which included such Muslim countries as Senegal, Mali and even Nigeria, a state where the Islamic influence is quite strong, adhered to the OAU principle of the territorial integrity of African countries and the inviolability of their borders. Some differences were also apparent in the attitudes of OAU members toward the so-called Eritrean problem, which has been poisoning the atmosphere in northeast Africa for several years. As JEUNE AFRIQUE reported in summer 1982, representatives of the Eritrean separatists, backed up by reactionary Arab regimes, solicited support for their claims,⁵ aimed at undermining the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, from the leaders of Senegal, Sierra Leone, Gabon, Niger, Mali and some other countries. These claims have been used by hostile forces in attacks on the Ethiopian revolution.

Some members of the OAU began to depart from the negotiated line of the African countries with regard to Middle East settlement, a line to which the majority of countries on the continent and the OAU as a whole have adhered. Some countries in Tropical Africa have not concealed their support for the Sadat government's separate policy. Under U.S. pressure, Zaire renewed diplomatic relations with Israel on 14 May 1982. This was done in violation of numerous OAU resolutions on one of the most urgent matters concerning the interests of not only African countries, but also other developing states. At the beginning of December 1982, then Israeli Foreign Minister Y. Shamir made an official visit to Zaire--the first visit by a high-level Israeli political figure to developing Africa in more than 10 years--and an agreement was signed on Zairian-Israeli

cooperation. Judging by reports in the foreign press, the military cooperation of the two countries was the subject of intensive talks. President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire reported that Israel would train a "special presidential brigade." In January 1983, when then Israeli Minister of Defense A. Sharon visited Kinshasa, an agreement was reached on the basic spheres of military cooperation by the two countries during the next 5 years.

Although only two countries--Zaire and Liberia--expressed a wish to renew diplomatic relations with Israel, it must be said that some countries--the Ivory Coast, Cameroon, Senegal, Zambia and Togo--refrained from officially censuring the Zairian actions violating OAU decisions, and Nigeria and Kenya voiced their objections in extremely weak terms. People in the majority of African countries are angry about Tel Aviv's aggressive behavior in the Middle East and--what is most important--about Israel's close military and political contacts with South Africa. Under these conditions, the Israeli Government has had to confine its relations to the semiofficial contacts it maintains with the Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Togo, Gabon, Lesotho and the Central African Republic. These countries have made no move to restore diplomatic relations.

In December 1980 Nigerian politician O. Awolowo advocated the resumption of diplomatic relations with Israel: in summer 1982 more than 100 deputies of the Nigerian National Assembly made a similar proposal. But Nigerian government circles implied that Lagos would request the OAU to reconsider the matter of the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel only when the latter stops all of its military cooperation with South Africa.

Differences of opinion between OAU members on several important political and economic issues have created favorable conditions for more pronounced political, economic and ideological expansion by the West, especially the United States, in Africa.

The measures to which American imperialism will resort in its struggle against African unity were attested to, for example, when J. Kirkpatrick, U.S. representative to the United Nations, toured a number of African states just before the 19th Assembly of Heads of State and Government, originally scheduled for August 1982, in the hope of convincing the leaders of these countries to boycott the assembly. The world press reported at that time that the Reagan Administration was taking explicit action to undermine OAU solidarity. Paris' LE MONDE remarked, for example, that "American embassies are actively urging the African countries to boycott the OAU session."⁸

The question of participation by the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic in the OAU was used as a pretext to wreck the assembly session. At the end of February 1982, at the 38th Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa, then Secretary General of the OAU E. Kodjo announced, fully in line with the provisions of the OAU charter, that the SDAR would be recognized as a full-fledged member of the organization, the 51st member, and that an SDAR delegation would be allowed to attend meetings,⁹ because in 1980, at the 35th Session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Freetown, the SDAR had received a simple majority, sufficient according to the OAU charter (Article 28) to be accepted on legal bases as a member of the organization.¹⁰ By a decision of the

17th Session of the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in Freetown, following the meeting of the ministers, the final decision on the SDAR's membership was postponed. Soon afterward, 26 OAU countries which had recognized the SDAR sent E. Kodjo a petition demanding immediate OAU membership for the SDAR. At the 18th assembly session in June 1981 in Nairobi, a decision was made to hold a referendum in the Western Sahara to give the population a chance to freely express its feelings about its future.

But this did not satisfy the SDAR's opponents. According to the OAU practice, at the 19th assembly in Tripoli the leader of the Libyan revolution, Mu'ammarr Qadhafi, was supposed to assume the office of chairman of the organization for 1 year. But this was wholly unacceptable to the Americans. After the 38th session of the OAU Council of Ministers in Addis Ababa, the United States intensified its campaign against Libya, urging the leaders of moderate African countries not to go to Tripoli. A campaign for a boycott of the scheduled conference was launched by Morocco, Zaire, Sudan, Somalia and several other countries. To prevent the lack of a quorum from ruining the assembly, representatives of 26 countries who arrived in Tripoli in August 1982 reached a compromise in which the SDAR delegation would be able to attend the session of the OAU Council of Ministers but would refrain "voluntarily and temporarily" from attending assembly meetings. The SDAR consented to these proposals.

But the adoption of the compromise proposed by the "group of 26" did not produce positive results; this provided more evidence that the issue of the SDAR was being used by moderate regimes to cancel the conference in Tripoli. The session of the OAU Council of Ministers did not take place, but a decision was nevertheless made not to postpone the OAU assembly session scheduled for 5 August 1982. Only 32 delegations, however, were present. Nigeria and Kenya made their participation conditional upon the presence of the necessary quorum of 34 votes, and their delegations therefore did not attend the subsequent consultations.

When it became clear that the 19th OAU assembly session could not be held, an information conference of the heads of state and government of 30 African countries was held in Tripoli outside the OAU framework. Its participants discussed a number of international and regional problems and the situation in the OAU in connection with imperialism's attempts to split the organization, and adopted the "Tripoli Declaration," in which they resolutely reaffirmed their loyalty to the cause of the continent's total liberation. The policy pursued by Western states, especially the United States, in Africa, particularly the cooperation with the South African regime and the attempts to destabilize the situation on the continent, evoked pointed criticism. Representatives of free Africa expressed serious worries about the establishment of military bases in various parts of the continent.

As for the Western Sahara issue, participants in this meeting declared support for the SDAR in its struggle to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. They asked the SDAR and Morocco to consider possibly ways of settling their differences. Participants underscored their intention to intensify their efforts to convene a session of the OAU assembly as soon as possible and adopted the decision proposed by J. Nyerere on the creation of a "contact

committee" to hold consultations with the boycotting countries and convince them of the need to convene the assembly.

The imperialist response to the disruption of the OAU assembly session in Tripoli was unconcealed gloating. Western propaganda exaggerated the differences of opinion over the SDAR, assuming--and not without good reason--that artificial problems of this kind would divert the African countries from truly vital issues.

A second attempt to hold an OAU assembly session in Tripoli was made in November 1982. Just as in August, U.S. imperialist circles did everything within their power to wreck these plans. Vice-President G. Bush traveled to many African states for this purpose. The new attempt to hold an OAU assembly session also ended in failure. This time the question of Chad's representation was the pretext. Two delegations from Chad arrived in Tripoli, both claiming to represent this country in the assembly:¹¹ One was sent by the Habre regime and the other was sent by the Provisional Government of National Union. The delegates who gathered in Tripoli expressed two points of view on the issue of Chadian representation. One was that the OAU should seat H. Habre's delegation, while the other insisted that Chad's place should remain vacant until a summit meeting, as it was precisely at this kind of meeting that the legality of G. Oueddei's provisional government had been recognized. After these disputes, a compromise decision was adopted on the initiative of President S. Shagari of Nigeria, in accordance with which the Habre delegation was recognized as the official representative of the Chadian government but was requested to refrain voluntarily from attending the OAU assembly session. The Habre government rejected this proposal.¹² This gave those who had boycotted the session a formal pretext for the refusal to participate in summit conferences. When the intrigues of pro-imperialist elements again precluded the quorum necessary for an OAU assembly session, a meeting of the leaders of 30 states was held in Tripoli¹³ and a decision was made to continue the efforts to convene the 19th assembly session; another "contact committee" was created, this time consisting of 12 states--Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Mali, Congo, Libya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, Angola and Lesotho. In a declaration adopted at the end of the conference in Tripoli, the heads of state and government of 30 countries expressed regrets with regard to the obstructionist behavior of some OAU members. In addition to the United States, other Western powers took energetic action to wreck the OAU assembly in Tripoli, the press reported. For example, at a Franco-African meeting in Kinshasa, France first promised the French-speaking countries economic assistance and then urged them to boycott the meeting in Tripoli. The African Socialist International also played a definite role in wrecking the OAU assembly.

The difficulties the OAU experienced in 1982 aroused lively debates in Africa on the future of the organization. According to some progressive African groups, it is not always easy for the OAU, which came into being on the wave of decolonization, to adapt to the present stage of the pronounced polarization of forces in Africa and to the sharply diverging views of countries which have chosen different patterns of socioeconomic development. Some even believe that the OAU in its present form is obsolete. And since this is the

case, they say, no one should care if it falls apart. But the more realistic representatives of progressive Africa reject this oversimplified approach because they are certain that the solidarity of the African countries is more important now than ever before, and that a split in the OAU would be primarily in imperialism's interest. It is no coincidence that the United States is now concentrating on undermining the intergovernmental organizations of developing countries, including the Arab League, the OAU and the Nonaligned Movement. For this reason, they stress, it is extremely important to preserve the OAU as a unified organization, but to make it more effective by exposing and isolating pro-Western regimes. For example, President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of the People's Republic of Angola announced on his return from Tripoli that maximum effort would be needed to preserve the unity of the OAU countries.

There is no question that the state of affairs in the OAU in 1982 attested to the ability of reactionary and imperialist forces to cause sharp conflicts between its members and thereby put the organization in an extremely difficult position. Nevertheless, although the OAU has experienced considerable difficulties in recent years, its platform has retained its anti-imperialist nature, and even pro-Western countries have had to adhere to the common line reflected in many OAU resolutions and decisions. The division of the OAU into two camps would have the most undesirable effect on the political and socioeconomic development of young states, would complicate the struggle against the racist South African regime and would undermine Africa's prestige in the international arena. Under these conditions, the position of Ethiopia, Angola, Tanzania and several other progressive states favoring the preservation of the OAU with more intense struggle for its pursuit of a more effective and purposeful policy on a consistently anti-imperialist basis, is realistic and farsighted.

Progressive circles in Africa have stressed that, in spite of existing differences, the African countries still have a common interest in the struggle to eradicate the after-effects of colonialism and the remaining traces of racism on the continent, to strengthen political independence and to achieve economic autonomy. "What actually unites Africa in the final analysis?" asked President Didier Ratsiraka of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar. "It is united by struggle against the South African regime, against its racism, against its colonialism, against its apartheid.... Africa is united by struggle against imperialism's domination and its aggressive attempts to undermine the independence of our people. It is united by struggle against the forces of destabilization and struggle for the genuine, effective and tangible solidarity of all those whose political, economic and social liberty is being threatened."¹⁵ "What unites the African states," the ETHIOPIAN HERALD stressed, "far surpasses what disunites them."¹⁶ Even the Western press has had to admit this fact. "There is no question that the preservation of the OAU is the principal goal of its members. After all, an objective assessment indicates...that the OAU had definite successes.... Acting as a middleman, the OAU has frequently been able to suggest acceptable solutions. Despite existing broad differences in government structure and ideology, African countries are continuing their dialogue with one another with the OAU's help."¹⁷

A desire for the maximum reinforcement of the OAU was expressed during meetings between leaders of some countries at the beginning of 1983. For example, when R. Mugabe visited Algeria, both countries reaffirmed their belief in the principles and goals of the OAU.¹⁸

When the "contact committee" created in Tripoli in November 1982 met in Nairobi in February 1983, it was able to reach a compromise on the location of the 19th OAU assembly session: A decision was made to convene it in the capital of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, the city where the constituent session of the OAU was held 20 years ago. Delegations from 50 countries attended the 19th session. It became one of the most representative sessions in OAU history. In the final analysis, the African countries were able to surmount the difficulties connected with convening the assembly and to preserve their intergovernmental organization. "Those who want to see Africa weak and divided," Ethiopian leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam stressed in his speech, "had already decided that our organization had outlived its usefulness and had ceased to exist as a result of the two failures to convene a 19th assembly session." However, he went on to say, "we forced silence on those who were secretly celebrating the probable disintegration of our unity, symbolized by the OAU."¹⁹

The assembly, which took place in a businesslike and constructive atmosphere, demonstrated the ability and desire of the African countries to consolidate their cooperation and settle their differences by means of discussion and negotiation. The need for stronger coordination and the pursuit of a common policy by African states in all spheres, from economics to culture, was underscored at the conference. In this context, the resistance of imperialist efforts to weaken African solidarity was also discussed. Resolutions were approved on all problems now constituting matters of special concern to the African people and included on the session agenda. In the resolution on Namibia, the supreme OAU forum again resolutely condemned the South African racists for obstructing the granting of independence to the Namibian people and refusing to act on the decisions of the UN Security Council and General Assembly on Namibia. African leaders rejected the attempt to link the granting of independence to this country with the presence of a contingent of internationalist Cuban forces in Angola, calling this false thesis overt interference in the internal affairs of the sovereign state of Angola. The sole basis for Namibian settlement, participants in the Addis Ababa meeting stressed, is UN Security Council Resolution 435. The African countries repeated their demand that the immediate liberation of Namibia be secured by free elections under UN supervision and control. They applauded the courageous struggle of the Namibian people under the guidance of SWAPO and reaffirmed their pledge to give SWAPO all-round support and material assistance. They reaffirmed their support for UN-specified comprehensive sanctions against South Africa and pointedly criticized the policy of the United States and its allies on this matter. The assembly decisions censured South Africa's policy of apartheid and subversive activity against neighboring African states. In a special resolution the African leaders expressed indignation at the economic blockade of Lesotho by the Pretoria regime.

Session documents resolutely condemn Israel's expansionist policy in the Middle East and contain an appeal for the removal of Israeli troops from all

occupied Arab territories. The resolutions on the Middle East say that any attempt at a Middle East settlement without recognition of the legal rights of the Palestinians cannot lead to peace. Special mention was made of the Israeli-South African collaboration, particularly the broader cooperation in the production of nuclear weapons.

In the resolution on the Western Sahara, the 19th session requested the conflicting sides to begin direct talks for the negotiation of a cease-fire and the creation of the necessary conditions for a UN- and OAU-sponsored referendum on self-determination in the region.²⁰ The organization's position on the situation in Chad and on several other continental problems was defined.

At a meeting of the bureau of the 19th session of the OAU assembly in the middle of July 1983, when the situation in Chad and in neighboring regions was discussed, a communique was adopted in which the OAU objected to any interference in the affairs of this central African republic and appealed for the resolution of the conflict within the OAU framework. The bureau requested political groups in Chad to act in the spirit of national conciliation, calling this the only way of establishing a just and lasting peace in the country.²¹

Assembly participants gave considerable attention to problems in economic cooperation by African countries and their participation in the struggle for the reorganization of international economic relations. Mengistu Haile-Mariam was elected OAU chairman for the next term. The next OAU summit meeting will be held in Conakry, the capital of Guinea.

The OAU was and is an important weapon of free and independent Africa in the struggle against imperialism, for economic and social progress and for a more important role for young African states in the international arena.

FOOTNOTES

4. "Materialy XXVI s"yezda KPSS" [Materials of the 26th CPSU Congress], Moscow, 1981, p 11.
5. JEUNE AFRIQUE, 26 July 1982.
8. LE MONDE, 10 June 1982.
9. The creation of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic was announced on 27 February 1976 by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Sagui el Hamra and Rio de Oro (POLISARIO), fighting for the independence of Western Sahara. A provisional constitution was adopted at the third congress of the front (August 1976), in accordance with which the SDAR was declared "a sovereign nonaligned Islamic state with a national-democratic orientation" and the goal of "building socialism" and a society of "social justice." The basic law regards the people of Western Sahara "as part of the Arab race" and describes Islam as "the public and state religion." Morocco, which has claimed the territory of Western Sahara, has been waging an armed struggle against POLISARIO partisans for several years with U.S.

military assistance. Despite considerable efforts, the OAU has been unsuccessful in settling the conflict. At the end of 1982 the SDAR was recognized by around 50 countries, including 28 African states. Many progressive parties, national liberation movements and public organizations in the world support POLISARIO. The Soviet Union has invariably advocated the resolution of the Western Sahara problem by peaceful political means with consideration for the interests of all sides concerned and without any outside interference, particularly military intervention. Furthermore, the USSR has adhered to its principled position in support of the right of the people of Western Sahara to self-determination and has acted in line with OAU and UN decisions.

10. FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1983, Vol 61, No 3, p 677.
11. The development of the Republic of Chad, which achieved independence in 1960, has taken place in an atmosphere of fierce political struggle. Demonstrations by Islamized minorities living in the north and northeast of the country became much more active in 1965. French troops were sent to Chad to suppress them, and these troops were later sent back to Chad several times. In 1975 army officers accomplished a coup d'etat. President Tombalbaye, the leader of the Progressive Party, was killed. The government was taken over by a Supreme Military Council, headed by General Malloum. In 1978 the Supreme Military Council was dissolved when the government reached an agreement with the military leaders of the opposition movement. At the end of 1979 a Provisional Government of National Union, headed by President G. Oueddei, was created after a mediation mission by several African states. The important post of state minister for defense was occupied by H. Habre (Oueddei and Habre were the leaders of the two main political groups of the eleven existing in Chad at that time, many of which had a regional or ethnic basis). These political changes did not put an end to ethnic, religious and social conflicts--the result of the earlier imperialist "divide and conquer" policy. After 2 years of armed struggle between the troops of the provisional government, headed by G. Oueddei, and the armed forces of the north, commanded by H. Habre, the latter took power in June 1982. But Oueddei did not lay down his weapons and he continued to fight against the Habre government. In summer 1983 this military confrontation became much more intense and was complicated by the direct military and political intervention of imperialist forces and their proteges.
12. This was announced by Idriss Miskine, Habre's commissioner of foreign affairs: "The facts," THE TIMES remarked in this connection, "that the foreign minister of Chad rejected the last-minute compromise and that this was announced while he was in Paris were interpreted by some radicals as proof that the decision had been influenced by France" (THE TIMES, 28 November 1982).
13. The meeting was attended by representatives from Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, the Republic of Cape Verde, the Congo, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda.

Zambia and Zimbabwe. Upper Volta registered as a participant after the end of the meeting. Sudan, Somalia and Egypt did not send representatives, and the SDAR, which had already been recognized by 28 OAU countries by the end of 1982, voluntarily refrained from participation. Another 15 countries refused to participate in the summit meeting, although they were represented at the session of the Council of Ministers--Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Gambia, Gabon, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Morocco, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Zaire.

15. AFRIQUE-ASIE, 14 September 1982.
16. ETHIOPIAN HERALD, 2 December 1982.
17. THE TIMES, 28 July 1982.
18. IZVESTIYA, 24 January 1983.
19. PRAVDA, 10 June 1983.
20. IZVESTIYA, 13 June 1982.
21. PRAVDA, 17 July 1983.

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CURRENT STAGE OF USSR-DPRK COOPERATION

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 23-30

[Article by V. I. Mel'nikov and A. T. Muratov]

[Text] On 9 September 1948, a real people's stage--the Democratic People's Republic of Korea--came into being for the first time in Korea's centuries-old history. The declaration of the DPRK was a natural historical result of the Korean people's many years of struggle against colonial oppression.

The years of the existence of socialist Korea have also been years of increasingly strong and productive Soviet-Korean cooperation and friendship.

For Korea this 35-year period has represented only a small part of its centuries-old history. From the standpoint of the significance of the political, social and economic changes that have taken place in the northern half of the country since the establishment of a people's government there, however, this has been a period of genuine political and economic independence, sovereign development, national growth and the flourishing of economics, science and culture.

The successes in the DPRK's socioeconomic development were made possible by the skillful use of the benefits of a social order by the people's government. These successes also testify that a previously underdeveloped country can win new victories in economic, cultural and political development and in the consolidation of its independence under socialist conditions by using the experience of fraternal socialist states and relying on their selfless assistance and all-round support. It was precisely in the creation of a socialist society with the selfless assistance of the world socialist system that the rich creative powers of the Korean people were revealed and the DPRK turned into a modern, developed industrial and agrarian socialist state.

Young people's Korea encountered severe trials and adversity during the war for independence in 1950-1953. The aggression launched by U.S. imperialism and South Korean reaction disrupted the peaceful life of the laboring public. But the people's government successfully passed this test of strength. The people, led by the Workers' Party, defended the freedom and independence of their homeland and protected their revolutionary gains. In this struggle,

the laborers of the DPRK acquired a strong sense of the importance of the great principles of proletarian internationalism. The fraternal assistance of the Soviet Union and the solidarity of all progressive forces in the world played a decisive role in putting an end to the American aggression.

Over the past 35 years the laborers of the DPRK have been quite successful in the construction of socialism and the development of science, culture and education. New industries have been established--machine building, shipbuilding, petrochemicals and others. The production of machine tools with programmed control, trucks, passenger cars, tractors, powerful bulldozers and excavators has been organized. The output of consumer goods is growing. In the 1970's the average annual rate of increase in industrial output was 15.9 percent, and the gross industrial product increased 3.8-fold.¹ The grain output reached 9.5 million tons (in 1982).²

Soviet-Korean friendship and cooperation have played an exceptionally important role in the socioeconomic and political development of the DPRK. Positive results of Soviet-Korean cooperation can be seen in virtually all sectors of the DPRK economy.

The growth of the scales of bilateral economic relations has been accompanied by the improvement of forms and methods of cooperation between the Soviet Union and socialist Korea. An important milestone in the expansion of Soviet-Korean economic cooperation and the reinforcement of its organizational principles was the creation of an intergovernmental advisory commission on economic, scientific and technical affairs in 1967. It regularly investigates possibilities for the consistent development of economic contacts between the two countries and draws up plans for their further expansion. The annual commission meetings are held alternately in Moscow and Pyongyang. The commission has met 18 times since its founding. The Soviet and Korean halves of the commission are headed by deputy heads of government in the two states.³

The coordination of prospects for economic and technical cooperation by Soviet and Korean planning agencies is a qualitatively new element in the system of bilateral cooperation. In 1975 and in 1980, for example, the state planning committees of the two countries held consultations on the development of trade and economic cooperation in 1976-1980 and 1981-1985. The protocol on the results of the talks between the two committees on cooperation in the current 5-year period envisages its further development in key sectors of the national economies of both countries and an increase in reciprocal deliveries of machines, equipment and other goods on this basis. It also stipulates that the Soviet Union will continue to render economic and technical assistance in the construction and enlargement of industrial facilities in the DPRK.⁴

The 1970's and early 1980's were distinguished by a search for, and incorporation of, new and more effective forms of Soviet-Korean economic and technical cooperation. Special importance has been attached to the compensatory form. Agreements concluded by the Soviet and DPRK governments in 1970 and 1976 envisage this form of repayment. In particular, credit extended for the enlargement and construction of new shops in the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant and the construction of vehicle battery, enamel pipe and microelectric motor

plants and others will be repaid with shipments of the products of these enterprises to the USSR after they start operating. In payment for Soviet technical assistance, the DPRK will send 60-80 percent of the products of the vehicle battery, enamel pipe and microelectric motor plants to the USSR for a long time. Cooperation on a compensatory basis will broaden the assortment of Korean goods shipped to the USSR and thereby give Korea a chance to pay off earlier, deferred loans from the Soviet Union. This will also give the DPRK the opportunity to participate more actively in international socialist division of labor.

On the basis of an intergovernmental agreement of 9 February 1976 on economic and technical cooperation, the Soviet Union pledged economic and technical assistance in the remodeling of several shops of the Kim Chak Metallurgical Plant to increase the steel output from 1 million tons a year to 2.4 million and to organize the production of hot-rolled sheet metal, and in the construction of the 150,000-kilowatt Chongjin TETs and bearing, ammonia and aluminum plants. To this end, the Soviet side extended the DPRK around 120 million rubles in credit on preferential terms.⁵ In line with the wishes of the DPRK Government, the USSR simultaneously offered it credit at up to 400 million rubles at 2 percent per annum to cover Korean payments to the Soviet Union in 1976-1980 for the repayment of the principal and interest on credit extended earlier as part of Soviet-Korean agreements and protocols in 1949-1973. The Korean side will repay the outstanding loans in 10 years, in equal annual shares beginning in 1981, with shipments of Korean goods to the Soviet Union in accordance with the current Soviet-Korean trade agreement.⁶

With the direct assistance of the USSR, 60 national economic facilities had been renovated, remodeled or built in the DPRK by the end of 1982.⁷ According to estimates, the proportions of total output accounted for by the products of enterprises built in the DPRK with Soviet aid in 1980 were 63 percent of the electrical power, 33 percent of the steel, 11 percent of the cast iron, 38 percent of the ferrous rolled metal products, 50 percent of the petroleum products, 20 percent of the fabric, 14 percent of the chemical fertilizer and 42 percent of the iron ore.⁸ The Soviet Union is participating in the transportation development program in the DPRK: It has supplied the DPRK with powerful steam locomotives and has aided in the planning and technical equipping of the Pyongyang subway, the re-equipping of Najin Port for the acceptance and processing of Soviet cargo, and the remodeling of the railroad from the Tumangan border station to the Port of Najin. Bilateral cooperation has been productive in logging operations entailing timber felling by Korean woodcutters in East Siberia for the needs of the DPRK national economy. A number of Korean timber enterprises are operating in Khabarovsk Kray and Amur Oblast, and the partial processing of timber on a time-sharing basis has been organized here. Soviet-Korean cooperation in fishing is also being developed.

People's Korea is being helped by the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belorussia and other Soviet union and autonomous republics. Here is just one example. Researchers from the Ukraine branch of the All-Union Scientific Research and Planning Institute of Industrial Power Facilities, a collective member of the Soviet-Korean Friendship Society, took part in designing the 100,000-kwt TES in Unggi, and later the 150,000-kwt Chongjin TETs. Ukrainian specialists participated in the construction of these facilities and conducted inspections.⁹

In 1982, with the assistance of the USSR, the Taedonggan Vehicle Battery Plant, with a projected capacity of 1.1 million batteries a year, and an ammonia plant in Aoji were put in operation, the 14th and 15th power units, each with a capacity of 100,000 kilowatt-hours, began producing electricity at the Pukchan TES, and the production of electrical motors for washing machines began at the microelectric motor plant in Pyongyang (projected capacity of 1 million motors a year). The Soviet Union is now rendering technical assistance in the augmentation of the capacity of the Pukchan TES to 1.6 million kilowatts, in the construction of the Nensong ball bearing plant (project annual output of 10 million units), a 150,000-kwt TES in Chongjin and an aluminum plant in Pukchan, and in the remodeling of mines in Anju.

The DPRK Government has repeatedly praised the Soviet equipment delivered to Korea and the selfless internationalist labor of Soviet people. Hundreds of specialists from the Soviet Union have been awarded orders and medals of the DPRK.

Soviet-Korean scientific and technical cooperation is being expanded. Scientific and technical achievements are exchanged for free on a mutual basis, with the two countries paying only the cost of preparing and delivering copies of documents. The Soviet Union has given the DPRK around 3,000 sets of technical documents of various kinds in the fields of geology, tractor and motor vehicle engineering, metallurgy, chemicals, the food and fish industries, power engineering and agricultural machine building, and other sectors of the national economy. Besides this, Soviet organizations gave the DPRK information about more than 5,000 different standards so that Soviet experience could be used in the creation and development of a national standardization service.¹⁰ The manufacture of many industrial goods has been organized in the DPRK with the aid of Soviet technical documents. In turn, the DPRK has given the Soviet side various technical documents concerning the production of polyvinyl alcohol, the methods of intensive pond farming, fishing techniques, the processing of sea food and the methods of cultivating some agricultural crops and medicinal herbs.

Within the context of this scientific and technical cooperation, the USSR is assisting in the training of Korean national personnel. More than 3,000 Korean specialists have undergone technical on-the-job training and gained experience at enterprises in the USSR.¹¹ Soviet scientists and specialists in various fields travel to the DPRK to learn about the operational experience of industrial enterprises and research establishments. Soviet-Korean scientific and technical cooperation is conducted through two channels: the bilateral standing sub-committee on scientific and technical cooperation and the academies of sciences in the two countries.

The Soviet Union is the DPRK's main trade partner. It accounts for around a third of all Korean foreign trade. The USSR ships complete sets of equipment for the metallurgical industry, agricultural machines, railway rolling stock, oil and ferroalloys, coke and coking coal, cotton, motor vehicles, other manufactured goods and raw materials to the DPRK and imports such traditional Korean export goods as crude minerals, ferrous and nonferrous metals, cement, magnesite clinker, chemicals, machine tools, consumer goods and agricultural produce.

The treaty on trade and navigation signed in Moscow in June 1960 has been important in promoting the development of Soviet-Korean trade and economic relations. Long-term trade agreements are concluded as offshoots of this treaty and give this trade stability. The agreement signed in July 1981 on reciprocal shipments of goods and payments in 1981-1985 envisages an increase of more than 40 percent in Soviet-Korean commercial exchange in comparison to the previous 5-year period. The dynamics of the trade between our countries over the last two decades are illustrated in the table.

USSR Trade with the DPRK
(millions of rubles, in current prices)

<u>Indicators</u>	<u>1960</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1982</u>
Turnover	102.7	336.0	338.2	572.1	681.0
Exports	35.5	207.0	186.8	287.9	318.5
Imports	67.2	129.0	151.4	284.2	362.5

Source: "USSR Foreign Trade (Statistical Summary)," Moscow, for the corresponding years.

In 1980 total turnover rose above the half-billion mark for the first time. In 1982 bilateral turnover was more than six times as great as it had been in 1960. The Soviet Union's share of DPRK foreign trade in 1982 was around 30 percent. In 1982 the USSR supplied people's Korea with goods worth 318.5 million rubles and imported 362.5 million rubles' worth of products from Korea.

Border trade is also being expanded. The Soviet side exports cameras, photographic paper, timepieces and clothing and purchases fresh tomatoes, other vegetables and apples from the DPRK for the needs of East Siberia and the Far East. The Dal'intorg Association acquires consumer goods, machine tools and finishing tile from the DPRK in exchange for Russian refrigerators, television sets and detergent.

One of the main reasons for the productive development of Soviet-Korean economic and technical cooperation is the scientifically sound choice of basic guidelines with consideration for the economic status of the DPRK, its geographic location, its natural and climatic conditions and its resources. Furthermore, priority has been assigned to the development of Korean enterprises in leading industries--ferrous metallurgy, power engineering, chemicals and petrochemicals and others.

A distinctive feature of this bilateral cooperation, which represents a comprehensive system, is its stability, stemming from the planned nature of the Soviet and Korean national economies and the long-term nature of their agreements on economic, scientific and technical cooperation. It is quite indicative that bilateral contacts have been more effective in recent years, as reflected in the organization of cooperation in planning and the introduction of the compensatory form of cooperation. The practice of bilateral relations

also attests to the significant role Soviet credit has played and is playing in the establishment and reinforcement of a socialist economy in the DPRK by securing capital investments in the most progressive sectors of the Korean national economy. The improvement of forms and methods of economic, scientific and technical cooperation and the more active use of bilateral contacts to heighten the effectiveness of national production in the USSR and DPRK will certainly serve the interests of the people of both countries and will aid in the successful performance of the difficult national economic tasks set at the 26th CPSU Congress and the Sixth KWP Congress.

The experience in Soviet-Korean economic, scientific and technical cooperation provides convincing proof of the viability of the ideals of proletarian and socialist internationalism. The principles of equality, mutual advantage and mutual assistance, by which the USSR is guided in its economic relations with other countries, including the DPRK, have proved to be completely valid.

The Soviet Union has invariably and consistently supported the Korean people's struggle for the peaceful democratic unification of their homeland and for the curtailment of imperialist interference in the internal affairs of the Korean nation.

The Soviet Union's actions in support of the DPRK and its position on the peaceful resolution of the Korean problem have been reaffirmed during the course of the successful development of Soviet-Korean political contacts, exchanges of representative party and parliamentary delegations, the mutual support of political documents and statements by the two sides and the institution of various measures and joint actions with other socialist countries in the international arena.

The USSR was the first to recognize the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, established on 9 September 1948. The institution of diplomatic relations between the two countries on 12 October of the same year marked the beginning of the young republic's international recognition. In the Soviet Union the DPRK found a reliable friend and a strong basis of support in confrontations with class enemies, in the protection of the interests of Korean laborers and in the defense of revolutionary gains against the intrigues of imperialism and its proteges.

The Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, signed 6 July 1961, made a substantial contribution to the consolidation of Soviet-Korean relations. The treaty embodied the desire of the people of both countries to strengthen bilateral ties and became an important guarantee of peace and security in the Far East. Article 1 of the treaty specifically stresses that the two sides "will continue to take part in all international actions aimed at safeguarding peace and security in the Far East and the rest of the world and will aid in the performance of these crucial functions." The Soviet Union and the DPRK pledged to "consult with one another on all important international issues concerning the interests of both states, guided by the desire to aid in the consolidation of peace and overall security."¹²

Soviet-Korean relations were developed further in the last decade. Political contacts between the USSR and DPRK and between the CPSU and KWP have been

maintained. Meetings and talks between party and governmental leaders of the two countries provide opportunities for the exchange of views on specific aspects of bilateral relations and a broad range of international issues. Sufficient proof of this can be gained from some of the major reciprocal visits of great importance in the reinforcement of Soviet-Korean relations. In October 1980 a delegation from the CPSU attended the Sixth KWP Congress in Pyongyang. A KWP delegation attended the 26th CPSU Congress. A delegation from the DPRK took part in celebrating the 60th anniversary of the USSR. There is no question that contacts like these promote deeper mutual understanding and cooperation between the two sides, the development of Soviet-Korean friendship and the coordination of efforts in the struggle against imperialism, against the threat of war and for peace and security.

The high level of diplomatic activity displayed by the USSR and the countries of the socialist community in the United Nations and other international organizations in support of the DPRK's struggle for the peaceful unification of Korea has been of serious help to the cause of a fair settlement in Korea. Since 1947 Soviet representatives to the United Nations have favored a fair solution to the Korean problem and have demanded that the United States fulfill the resolutions of the 30th Session of the UN General Assembly. "The Korean problem can and must be solved by peaceful means," said USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs A. A. Gromyko at a plenary meeting of the 36th Session of the UN General Assembly. "The unresolved nature of this problem has long been a source of tension in the Far East. We regard the DPRK's proposals as a suitable basis for the settlement of the conflict."¹³

The consistent support of the USSR and its solidarity with DPRK efforts to bring about the peaceful reunification of Korea have also been reflected in the active participation of Soviet representatives in international political undertakings organized by international or regional organizations in support of this reunification. In recent years, for example, Soviet representatives attended the Tokyo (1978) and Algiers (1981) international conferences, the world journalists conference in Helsinki (1982) and the international youth conference in Tokyo (1982) in support of the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea.

Close ties and contacts also exist between the highest legislative bodies in the two countries--the USSR Supreme Soviet and the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly (SPA). Specifically, these include the exchange of parliamentary delegations and interaction in the international arena. The USSR Supreme Soviet has invariably displayed solidarity with the DPRK. It commended the DPRK SPA's appeals to the parliaments and governments of the world's nations on matters connected with the relaxation of tension on the Korean peninsula and the peaceful resolution of the Korean problem. The USSR Supreme Soviet's broad support of DPRK proposals on the negotiation of a peace in Korea is an important element of Soviet-Korean political cooperation.

The traditional month-long campaigns conducted each year in the Soviet Union to demonstrate solidarity with the Korean people's efforts to remove foreign troops from South Korea have become an effective way of supporting the DPRK laboring public's struggle for the independent and peaceful unification of

their homeland and the curtailment of imperialist intervention in Korean affairs. During these campaigns, Soviet people learn of a fraternal people's achievements in socialist construction, display their desire to strengthen and develop friendship and cooperation with the DPRK laboring public and demonstrate solidarity with the Korean people's struggle for the removal of all foreign troops from Korean territory and for the peaceful unification of the country on a democratic basis.

The entire experience of Soviet-Korean relations within the framework of the socialist system reaffirms the viability of V. I. Lenin's idea that proletarian internationalism is never contrary to national interests because the unity and sovereignty of socialist countries represent two interrelated aspects of a single proletarian method of organizing cooperation by socialist states.

Cultural contacts play an important role in Soviet-Korean relations. The first intergovernmental agreement on economic and cultural cooperation, signed in March 1949, laid the legal basis for cultural contacts between the two countries. The provisions of this agreement with regard to cooperation in the sphere of culture were later clarified and amplified in the agreement on Soviet-Korean cultural cooperation of 5 September 1956. The need to develop and strengthen bilateral cultural contacts is also recorded in the Soviet-Korean Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance of 6 July 1961. In accordance with these agreements, there are regular tours by entertainment troupes, groups of performers and soloists, exhibits of paintings, applied arts and photographs, screenings of art films and documentaries and exchanges of delegations representing various spheres of culture and art. Korean representatives attend international competitions and festivals in the USSR.

The tours of entertainment troupes, circuses and acting companies have always been major events in the mutual enrichment of the Soviet and Korean cultures and in the cultural life of the two countries in general. Performances by the Pyongyang song and dance company, the Korean People's Army song and dance company, the Pyongyang P'hipada and Mansude opera companies evoked warm responses from the inhabitants of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other Soviet cities. The talent and skill of Korean singers, musicians and dancers are highly appreciated by the Soviet cultural community and audiences. Entertainment troupes from the border provinces of the DPRK have toured the Soviet Maritime Kray successfully. In turn, renowned Soviet troupes have performed in people's Korea several times with great success. Korean artists regularly take part in such major international cultural events as the Moscow International Tchaikovsky Competition, the Moscow International Music Festival and the International Asian, African and Latin American Film Festival in Tashkent. They have been quite successful here. Talented Korean violinist Kim Song-ho made a great impression on participants and guests at the Sixth International Tchaikovsky Competition in 1980 and deservedly became one of the winners, and at the seventh competition in 1982 violinist So Yeng-nang was awarded a special prize. At the Fifth Tashkent International Film Festival (1980) an art film from the DPRK, "A Song Heard on the Battlefield," was awarded a prize. In 1981 a work by Korean composer Mun Geng-ok was performed at the International Moscow Music Festival.

Filmmakers in the USSR and DPRK have close and frequent contacts. They are regulated by cooperation programs negotiated annually by the USSR State Committee for Cinematography and the DPRK Ministry of Culture and Art and the Soviet and Korean unions of cinematographers. These include, in particular, reciprocal visits by film industry representatives, the exchange of technical and creative experience and participation in film festivals and film fairs. Film weeks and premieres of films made in Soviet and Korean studios are organized. The plan for cooperation in cinematography in 1983, signed in Moscow on 27 January 1983, envisages the further development of creative ties by masters of the screen in the two countries.

In the postwar period more than 10.5 million copies of 227 books and brochures by DPRK authors in all fields of literature have been published in the Soviet Union. Works of Korean poetry, prose, drama and oral folk literature have been translated into 21 languages of the USSR nationalities. The works of the great Korean writer Li Gi-yeng have been published 14 times in 10 national languages of the USSR, a total of around 1.3 million copies.

Cooperation in higher education and personnel training is an extremely important part of Soviet-Korean relations. During the first years of the establishment of public Korean higher education, the Soviet Union was extremely helpful in the organization of the DPRK higher educational system, sending specialists, equipment, textbooks, teaching materials, curricula and teaching aids to Korea for this purpose. Many Korean specialists, post-graduate students and professional trainees were educated in the USSR. Cooperation with the Soviet Union and the training of Korean specialists in Soviet VUZ's made a definite contribution to the successful attainment of an objective set by the KWP--the education of a million-member national intelligentsia.

Soviet-Korean academic cooperation is part of bilateral cultural exchange but it has its own history, spanning a period of almost 40 years and reflecting the main stages of the establishment and development of contacts and ties between Soviet and Korean scholars and academics. This cooperation began when the first group of young Korean scholars went to the USSR for the 1946/47 academic year, when the first group of Soviet scholars, headed by academician A. I. Oparin, arrived in Korea in July 1948, followed by a group of 30 scholars in 1949, and when the Soviet Union assisted in laying the foundations for the future DPRK Academy of Sciences.¹⁴

The founding of the DPRK Academy of Sciences on 1 December 1952 and the signing of an agreement in October 1957 on scientific cooperation between the USSR and DPRK academies, an agreement which was renewed in 1969, were important milestones in Soviet-Korean academic cooperation. Between 1957 and 1969 the Soviet Union was visited by more than 120 Korean scholars, and more than 20 Korean specialists completed post-graduate studies in institutes of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Around 100 Soviet scholars visited the DPRK, and Soviet VUZ's trained many Korean academic personnel.

In the 1970's and early 1980's the contacts between the academies of sciences in the two countries continued to take the form of the exchange of academic delegations, reciprocal exchanges of scholars for professional training, the

exchange of academic literature and the invitation of renowned scholars for the presentation of lectures and consultations. The joint work of linguists from the two countries produced good results: Specialists from the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences, headed by L. B. Nikol'skiy, and scholars from the Institute of Linguistics of the DPRK Academy of Social Sciences, headed by Tsoy Deng-u, compiled a two-volume Korean-Russian dictionary, containing around 150,000 words.

Scientists from the USSR and DPRK conduct joint research in the medical and agricultural sciences. Scientists from the DPRK are working successfully with colleagues from 10 other socialist countries in the Joint Institute for Nuclear Research in Dubno.

Soviet-Korean cultural cooperation extends to spheres other than those mentioned above. Mutually beneficial contacts and exchanges are maintained on the basis of plans in the areas of public health, medicine and radio and television broadcasting. Constructive contacts have been organized between unions of journalists, writers, artists and musicians. Agreements on cooperation between TASS and the KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS AGENCY (KCNA) and between APN and KCNA have been signed and are being implemented. The editors of PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA regularly contact the editors of RODONG SINMUN and MINJU CHOSON. Contacts and exchanges of delegations between trade unions, youth groups and other public organizations in the two countries are upheld as a tradition.

The cooperation between the USSR and DPRK testifies that great achievements in cultural construction in the DPRK and the successful creation of a new, socialist intelligentsia are indissolubly connected with the existence of the world socialist system and the mutual understanding and reciprocal influence of socialist countries. Spiritual communication and mutual cultural enrichment are a guarantee of even deeper cultural cooperation between the USSR and DPRK and stronger Soviet-Korean friendship in the future.

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 12 October 1980.
2. RODONG SINMUN, 29 December 1982.
3. "Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s narodnoy Koreyey" [The Soviet Union's Relations with People's Korea], Moscow, 1981, pp 250-254.
4. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1980, No 49.
5. "Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s narodnoy Koreyey," pp 343-345.
6. Ibid., pp 346-347.
7. PRAVDA, 5 March 1983.
8. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1980, No 33.

9. PRAVDA UKRAINY, 10 July 1979.
10. EKONOMICHESKAYA GAZETA, 1980, No 33.
11. M. Ye. Trigubenko, "Narodnoy Koreye--30 let" [People's Korea Is 30 Years Old], Moscow, 1975, p 48.
12. "Otnosheniya Sovetskogo Soyuza s narodnoy Koreyey," pp 196-198.
13. PRAVDA, 23 September 1981.
14. S. G. Nam, "Formirovaniye narodnoy intelligentsii v KNDR" [The Development of a People's Intelligentsia in the DPRK], Moscow, 1970, pp 60, 61, 83, 84.

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CSO: 1807/122

SCHOLARLY 'RUSSIAN PALESTINIAN SOCIETY' DESCRIBED ON CENTENARY

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 88-92

[Article by A. F. Berdnikov: "Centenary of the Russian Palestinian Society"]

[Excerpts] The Russian Palestinian Society (RPO) of the USSR Academy of Sciences is one of the oldest scholarly societies in our country. It was founded in 1882 in response to the development of Oriental Studies in Russia. From the time of its founding, the society's chief aims have been the study of the history, culture, archaeology, philology and ethnography of Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq and other countries in the Middle East, the compilation of basic works on Palestinian and Arab studies and the broad dissemination of scientific information about current events in the Arab East.

A new stage in the RPO's activities began with the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The composition of the society, uniting the most prominent representatives of prerevolutionary Arab studies, was subsequently augmented considerably by representatives of various fields of Oriental studies. This was connected with the broader subject matter of scientific research, the processes taking place in public life in the Eastern countries under the influence of the ideals of October and the need to reveal the main tendencies of revolutionary development in the East. Academicians A. A. Guber, V. V. Struve, S. L. Tikhvinskiy, B. B. Piotrovskiy, B. A. Rybakov, A. P. Okladnikov and Ye. M. Primakov, corresponding members of the USSR Academy of Sciences N. B. Pigulevskaya and Z. V. Udal'tsova and other prominent Soviet scholars--authors of major works on the history, economics, politics, ideology, culture and philology of the foreign East--were members of the RPO at various times. The comprehensive study of the Middle East has remained the society's main field of research.⁴

In the 1960's, 1970's and 1980's, RPO scholars compiled and published works¹¹ defining Zionism as the ideology of the grand Jewish bourgeoisie, which has merged with monopolists in the United States and other imperialist nations. The events of recent years have completely corroborated the accuracy of the Soviet scholars' conclusions about the goals, substance and nature of international Zionism. In the Middle East Zionism is an instrument of U.S. imperialist policy and is directed against the Arab people's national liberation movement and against the reinforcement of Arab ties with socialist

countries. The events of 1982 in Lebanon clearly showed that the main purpose of Israel's invasion of a sovereign Arab country was the destruction of the PLO and the Palestine Resistance Movement, representing the vanguard of the Arab national liberation movement, in order to create new conditions favoring the continuation of the Camp David line for the further alienation of Arab countries. This was declared in the RPO statement on the Israeli aggression against Lebanon of 28 July 1982.¹²

A new organizational feature of RPO activity in recent years has been the close coordination of its research with the research of other Oriental studies establishments: the Oriental Studies Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences and its Leningrad branch, the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the State Museum of Oriental Art, the Oriental Department of Leningrad State University and the Asia and Africa Institute of the Moscow State University imeni M. V. Lomonosov. This coordination has improved the society's work and has deepened and broadened the subject matter of its research.

The current objectives of the RPO include the further development of the traditions of Soviet Arab, Hebrew and Byzantine studies, the study of the ancient civilizations of Asia Minor, assistance in the protection and preservation of world cultural monuments, scientific criticism of theories about the national exclusivity and superiority of some ethnic groups, races and cultures, the reinforcement of scientific and cultural contacts with countries in the Middle East and with foreign scholars, and the exposure of the reactionary essence of international Zionism, its ideology and practice and its subversive and aggressive policy in the Middle East.

As the Russian Palestinian Society enters the 101st year of its existence, it views the extensive participation of Soviet scholars in the support of the Palestinian Arabs' just struggle as its civic, international and political duty.

FOOTNOTES

4. During the period of the British Palestine Mandate (1920-1947) the society ceased its educational activity and concentrated on the study of the Middle East.
11. G. S. Nikitina, "Gosudarstvo Izrail' (osobennosti ekonomicheskogo i politicheskogo razvitiya)" [The State of Israel (The Distinctive Features of Its Economic and Political Development)], Moscow, 1968; Yu. S. Ivanov, "Ostorozhno, sionizm" [Caution, Zionism], Moscow, 1970; L. A. Modzhoryan, "Prestupnaya politika sionizma i mezhdunarodnoye pravo" [The Criminal Policy of Zionism and International Law], Moscow, 1953; and others.
12. LITERATURNAYA GAZETA, 28 July 1982.

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DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM AND INTENSIFICATION OF SOCIAL CONFLICTS IN IRANIAN CITIES (1960's-1970's)

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 100-106

[Article by M. N. Zagvozdina]

[Text] The 1960's and 1970's were a period of rapid capitalist development in Iran. The combination of agrarian reform and measures to develop culture and education was called "the white revolution" and put an end to the domination of the country by the feudal landowner class; the bureaucratic and industrial-financial bourgeoisie took the leading positions in Iranian economics.

The transition to the new stage in the country's development was not a spontaneous change evoked by revolutionary struggle "from below," but by the implementation of a purposeful policy by the former shah and the shah's court after the need to transform feudal relations in order to surmount Iran's socioeconomic underdevelopment was recognized. The reason for this was the weakness of the Iranian bourgeoisie, which did not have a sufficiently strong political organization and therefore could not seize political power. The reform process and the changes in the social base of the shah's regime were therefore accompanied by the retention of all power by the shah and those closest to him.

The national bourgeoisie was not only excluded from direct government but also depended wholly on the shah, on his economic policy and on state financial resources. In turn, the shah, who was rapidly turning into a major capitalist and was accumulating huge sums of money as a result of growing oil revenues, promoted the development of big private capitalist enterprise in every way possible, protected its interests and aided directly and indirectly in the formation of a grand bourgeoisie.

The Iranian industrial bourgeoisie could be divided into three categories according to origins. The first group consisted of former landowners who had received compensation from the state for land confiscated from them during the period of land reform. Even before the reform at the beginning of the 1960's, feudal landowners had close ties with the commercial bourgeoisie; the former had commercial interests in the cities and the latter frequently invested capital in land rather than in industry. After the reform these landowners

were given a chance to buy stock in state industrial enterprises with the money received in compensation for their land. In this way, the economic activity of the class (or, more precisely, the segment of this class) "bought out" by the shah was directed into industrial channels.

The second group consisted of civil servants who had saved up large sums of money--by honest and dishonest means--in their careers. The assurance of a constant salary helped them overcome their traditional fear of investing funds in risky industrial enterprises.

Finally, the third and largest group consisted of former bazaar merchants. Some of them had made a fortune in speculation during the difficult years of World War II while others had gone to work as the commercial middlemen of foreign firms. Getting this kind of job generally required connections in high places and, consequently, few of these capitalists achieved high status in the full sense of the term on their own, independently of the shah's court. In one way or another, many of them became big businessmen throughout the Middle East, and not only in Iran. For example, Ahmad Hayami, the owner of Irannational, the largest Iranian automobile plant, began his career as the agent of a dried-fruit export firm. Habib Sabet, who owned around 50 different companies at the end of the 1970's, started as an apprentice clerk in a bicycle shop. The Irvani (Melli industrial group) and Lajvardi (Behshehr industrial group) entrepreneurial families had similar origins.

The development of big private enterprise was exceptionally rapid as a result of the shah's policy of industrialization. Its focal point was the creation of a complex of modern industries according to the Western model--metallurgy, machine building, petrochemicals, automobile manufacture, electronics, electrical equipment, etc.; in other words, industries which Iranian leaders believed could essentially secure expanded reproduction on a national basis.

The quadrupling of oil revenues as a result of the oil boom of 1973-1974 (20 billion dollars a year on the average) made it possible for the shah's government to intensify the plans for industrialization. The concentration of production and capital occurred almost immediately, and capital began to acquire monopolistic features. In 1974, 45 families controlled 85 percent of the large firms with a turnover of more than 10 million rials each.¹ These monopolies developed quickly in traditional industries and in new ones, but it was the creation of the modern industrial sector that stimulated this process. In this sector the formation of monopoly capital was a particularly intensive process. Examples of this are the Shahriar group in metallurgy, the Behshahr group in chemicals, the Arj company in consumer goods production, the KBS group in pharmaceuticals, etc.

The concentration of industrial capital was accompanied by such processes as the concentration of financial capital, the merger and association of industrial and financial groups through participation in mixed state-private companies and the appointment of members of entrepreneurial families to high government posts. In other words, the basic elements of state-monopoly capitalism took only 10-15 years to develop in a backward, semifeudal country.

The fundamental way in which the genesis and development of monopoly capital in Iran differed from the "classic" Western model, as S. L. Agayev correctly points out, was that the Iranian process "was not the result of the capitalist conversion of many cottage and semicottage industries and elementary forms of enterprise or other internal prerequisites, but of what could be called outside influences, aided and directly supported 'from above' by measures of a state-capitalist nature."² Large-scale capitalist production did not have a broad base in the country, and this was the reason for its "exclusive, elitist and therefore ephemeral nature."³

The lowest forms of capitalist enterprise were predominant in the economy in general and in industry in particular. The absolute reduction of small-scale capitalist production units in industry and their gradual transfer to the sphere of services and trade was accompanied by an absolute increase in the number of small industrial enterprises and of their employees. In 1972, 219,000 of the 225,000 industrial enterprises had less than 10 employees.⁴ In 1973/74, 238,226 of the total 251,268 industrial enterprises were small (with less than 10 employees). There were 6,156 large enterprises, including 3,537 with 10-19 employees, 1,572 with 20-49, 528 with 50-100, 211 with 101-200, 162 with 201-500, and 146 with more than 500 employees.⁵ The growth of big private capitalist business was accompanied by the expansion of the lowest urban economic forms. Developed capitalism could not "digest" these forms and transform all urban society according to its own pattern.

Employment statistics in the processing industry indicate that most of those employed were outside the sector of big private capitalist production. In 1966/67, 1,252,400 people were employed in the processing industry, crafts and manufacturing, but only 222,400, or 17.8 percent, worked at large enterprises (with 10 or more employees). A decade later, around 411,500 of the 1,672,000 people engaged in industrial production, or 24.6 percent, were employed by large enterprises. In other words, more than three-fourths of those employed in industry in the second half of the 1970's were working at small enterprises of the traditional type. Hired labor at large enterprises--that is, the plant and factory proletariat, numbering 395,500 in 1976/77--represented only 43.9 percent of all hired labor in industry and 23.6 percent of all employment in industry.⁶ These figures corroborate V. P. Tsukanov's statement that "industrial development with an emphasis on 'key branches' did not prove effective in the organic reorganization of the lowest levels of the national economy."⁷

The accelerated capitalist development in a narrow sector of the economy is a feature common to several oil-producing Persian Gulf countries. The reason is that local big capital prevents the capitalist development of pre-capitalist and small-scale units by feeding on them like a parasite. As a result, the development of capitalism in breadth is too slow while its development in depth is quite rapid, and this is reflected in the accelerated concentration of production and capital in the narrow sector of modern capitalist enterprise. The exacerbation of all types of conflicts in a multileveled society is a natural result of this development.

The intensive development of capitalism in depth in a narrow sector of the economy in a socioeconomically backward country like Iran meant that the

overwhelming majority of the population "never boarded the ship of industrialization"; the oil boom and the consequent changes in economic policy benefited only small social groups: mainly the grand bureaucratic and industrial-financial bourgeoisie and the substratum of skilled workers in large-scale modern production, which the shah tried to turn into a labor aristocracy and a middleman in his exertion of pressure on the working class.

Socioeconomic proportions which had been taking shape in the country for centuries were abruptly violated, and severe social upheavals engulfed the entire society, particularly its urban portion. In the economic sphere, accelerated industrialization revealed such acute problems as the limitations of the national market, the weakness of the production infrastructure (particularly the railroads and ports), the shortage of skilled labor, inflation and so forth--in other words, all of the problems resulting from the inability of a backward economy to absorb huge investments effectively. All of these difficulties led to the deceleration of economic growth by the middle of the 1970's and eventually wrecked the fifth 5-year plan (1973/74-1977/78).

Many Iranian and Western economists foresaw the deceleration of economic development, but few could have judged the significance of the abrupt changes in the social sphere.

The most general social result of the shah's policy was an even greater rift between the poor and the rich. In general, the material and cultural standard of living rose slightly, but differences in the living conditions of various social groups became much more pronounced. The distribution of national income is indicative in this respect. In 1969 the top 10 percent of the population accounted for 32.5 percent of all consumer spending, and the next 10 percent accounted for another 15.5 percent; this means that the top 20 percent accounted for 47 percent, or almost half of all this spending. In 1976 the top 10 percent already accounted for 40 percent of the spending. Apparently, it was this 10 percent--around 3.5 million people, or around a million families⁸--that constituted the privileged group benefiting from the industrialization process.

Most of the rich families were concentrated in large cities, particularly Tehran, and this intensified the contrast between urban and rural areas and between large and small cities. In 1972 the inhabitants of Tehran, representing 10 percent of the Iranian population, accounted for 33 percent of all consumer spending, other cities (one-third of the total population) accounted for 36 percent, but the rural population (over 50 percent) accounted for only 32 percent of this spending. Whereas in 1959/60 urban per capita spending was only twice as high as rural spending, it was already three times as high in 1971/72.⁹

The policy of accelerated industrialization intensified disparities in the statuses of people living in industrially developed and backward regions. The central and northern provinces had the greatest advantages. In 1971/72, for example, the average monthly family income was 8,711 rials in Eastern Azerbaijan, 8,329 in Gilan, only 3,845 in Kerman and 5,012 in Sistan and Baluchistan.¹⁰

Another extremely important result of the shah's economic policy was the intensification of differences in the statuses of various segments of the working class. As we know, the shah passed two laws which were supposed to put the working class in a better position: a law on profit-sharing and a law on the distribution of industrial enterprise stock to the public. These laws actually extended to a small portion of workers,¹¹ because they were designed to create the labor aristocracy with whose aid the shah hoped to preserve class peace in the country.

These measures certainly did not improve the position of the working class or change the class essence of the shah's regime. They simply meant that the shah could use oil revenues to substitute bribery for repression in the struggle against the working class. This was also why the Ministry of Labor sometimes took the side of the workers when it was called in to settle strikes at industrial enterprises.¹²

These methods, which attest to the shah's desire to be a middleman between the grand bourgeoisie and the working class, could not and did not secure political stability. On the contrary, there was an increase in social friction: First, as a result of increased antagonism between the privileged elite of the working class and the majority of workers who did not gain these anticipated benefits and, secondly, as a result of the negative response of employers to these political maneuvers, taking the form of attempts to transfer their capital abroad.¹³ This last fact corroborates the thesis of Soviet Orientalists about the relative independence of the civil service (the bureaucratic bourgeoisie), which generally acted with a view to the fundamental, long-term interests of the industrial-financial bourgeoisie but which could act against the non-fundamental, immediate interests of certain segments of the bourgeoisie in order to secure the stability of the entire capitalist system and to protect its own interests (in this case, its interest in maintaining the shah's authoritarian government).

It is significant, however, that it was not these conflicts (although they were of indisputable importance) that played the deciding role in the maturation of the revolutionary situation in the mid-1970's. The discontent of the broad popular masses with the shah's socioeconomic policy was more significant. This discontent was particularly warranted, as mentioned above, in the case of the part of the working class that gained few advantages or none at all from this policy. These were mainly semiskilled and unskilled laborers, as well as workers employed in traditional industry. The general rise in wages in the mid-1970's (by an average of 30-50 percent) made differences in the wages of these categories particularly apparent because low-paid workers were in a relatively worse position than before. For example, the wages of workers in new industries (such as automobile manufacture or construction materials) were twice as high as the wages of workers in the textile and footwear industries.¹⁴ In some industries the acute shortage of skilled labor and the resulting wage policy intensified the disparity in the incomes of skilled and unskilled workers. Skilled workers in construction--carpenters, electricians and plumbers--earned 15 times as much as unskilled workers at the end of the 1960's and the beginning of the 1970's.¹⁵

Urban workers who had migrated from rural areas and small towns were in a particularly difficult position. Migration from rural regions to industrial centers took on huge dimensions in the late 1960's and early 1970's as a result of the agrarian reform and industrialization. Over a decade--from 1966 to 1976--the population of the country increased by around 30 percent, as the figures below testify, but the increase was 60 percent in cities and only 11 percent in rural areas:¹⁶

<u>Population categories</u>	<u>1966</u>	<u>1976</u>	<u>Increase</u>
National	25,788,722	33,591,875	7,803,153
Urban	9,794,246	15,715,338	5,921,092
Rural	15,994,476	17,876,537	1,882,061

Economists have estimated that 35 percent of the increase in the urban population during this decade was due to migration from rural areas.¹⁷ Most of the migrants went to Tehran (after the 1973 boom the population growth rate there was 8 percent),¹⁸ exacerbating problems in transportation, water supply, environmental pollution, etc. Migrants took shelter in the southern part of the city, where their living and working conditions (when they could find work) and their wages were on the lowest level. Migrants also gathered in Tabriz, Isfahan, Shiraz and other large cities; they went there in search of permanent or seasonal jobs but usually augmented the ranks of the urban paupers. This social group sensed the extreme instability of its social status and constituted the combustible material that was so easily set aflame by the religious leaders who headed the revolution of 1978-1979. Migrants who were able to find permanent work in the cities were in a slightly better position, but they were also discriminated against, in comparison to the native urbanites. A study conducted in Shiraz indicated that the income of rural migrants, regardless of their skills, age and education, was 1,870 rials lower than the income of native workers.¹⁹

On the whole, 73 percent of the laboring population had an income below the official minimum.²⁰ Wage increases were accompanied by sharp price increases. The prices of consumer goods rose 13.1 percent in 1969-1970 and 20 percent in 1973-1974.²¹ Rents rose dramatically due to the rising price of land during an economic boom.²² Workers paid up to 60 percent of their wages in rent in the middle of the 1970's.²³ Therefore, even when the wage increases of the 1970's improved the status of the working class, it was only to a slight degree and extended only to the small upper substratum.

In the Iranian city there is also another large group--made up of a variety of social classes--which did not benefit from the shah's industrialization according to the Western model and even suffered a direct injury to its economic interests. This group consisted of members of the petty and middle industrial bourgeoisie and various strata of the merchant and moneylender bourgeoisie--that is, people connected with the traditional urban economy and, consequently, with the bazaar, which had long been the commercial, economic and sociopolitical center of the city. Competition from large modern enterprises gradually reduced the sphere of activity of small and middle industrialists; the banks and commercial firms that came into being during the process

of economic modernization reduced the scales of bazaar financial and commercial operations. The Iranian bazaar had accumulated colossal economic and political strength over all the centuries of its existence. Even in the middle of the 1970's the bazaar controlled more than two-thirds of domestic wholesale trade and 30 percent of the country's imports.²⁴ The bazaar had its own sources of foreign currency (independent of official channels) because it controlled exports of rugs, walnuts and dried fruit. Besides this, the bazaar was always the center where urban public opinion was formed. Distinguished by conservative attitudes and constant devotion to Islam, the bazaar was the clergy's main basis of economic and sociopolitical support.

While the shah was modernizing the economy and public life, he gradually and carefully reduced the authority of the bazaar. Several steps were taken to this end. First of all, new state schools, residential neighborhoods and shopping centers were built outside the bazaar boundaries; bazaar streets were widened so that security forces could have freer access to them when necessary. Secondly, the banking system and wholesale trade were modernized. State corporations engaged in the import and distribution of the main food products (wheat, sugar and meat) and the main raw materials (cement and steel) were founded in 1973. Thirdly, a campaign against speculation and rising prices was launched to diminish the bazaar's influence, but this campaign was largely unsuccessful: Prices on the black market continued to rise, and bazaar bigwigs grew increasingly discontented with the shah's policy. In all, more than 20,000 people were arrested and fined during the campaign. The people who suffered the most from the campaign included such prominent businessmen as Habib Ilhanian, Mohammad Wahabzade, Habib Sabet and others.

Members of the traditional middle urban strata had several reasons other than purely economic ones to be dissatisfied with the shah's policy. One was the Westernization of all sociocultural life in the country. Indignation at the corrupting influence of the Western mass culture on the Iranian way of life, family structure, moral standards and mentality was one of the main reasons why various social strata of urban society responded with so much enthusiasm to the clergy's sermons against the shah and against imperialism (particularly the American brand).

When the clergy's influence in Iranian public life was threatened, it took advantage of the mounting social friction and exacerbation of social conflicts in the cities to rouse the people for a struggle against the reactionary shah's regime and against American dominance in the country.

Therefore, the revolution of 1978-1979 was the "angry reaction of traditional social structures" to "accelerated capitalist modernization according to the Western model."²⁵ The objective content of this revolution was and is struggle for the development of capitalism on a broad national basis, but the reinforcement of the reactionary political superstructure in Iran at the beginning of the 1980's will considerably restrict the possibilities created by the revolution for the country's further advancement along the road of social progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. F. Halliday, "Iran. Dictatorship and Development," Harmondsworth, 1979, p 151.
2. S. L. Agayev, "Revolutionary Movements and Reforms in Iran," in: "Revolutsionnyy protsess na Vostoke. Istoriya i sovremennost'" [The Revolutionary Process in the East. Past and Present], Moscow, 1982, p 288.
3. Ibid., p 292.
4. F. Halliday, op. cit., p 182.
5. "Results of the Municipal Population Census of 1973-1974," Tehran, 1974, p 1.
6. Calculated according to: "Iran Reflected in Statistics," Tehran, 1981, pp 14, 55; "National Population Census," Tehran, 1967, p 41; "Melkoye proizvodstva goroda v Azii i Afrike" [Small-Scale Urban Production in Asia and Africa], Moscow, 1974, p 163.
7. "Problemy razvitiya stran sovremennogo Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka" [Problems in the Development of the Countries of Today's Near and Middle East], Moscow, 1981, p 18.
8. F. Halliday, op. cit., p 166.
9. G. Lenczowski, "Iran Under the Pahlavis," Stanford, 1978, p 145.
10. Ibid.
11. For example, in the case of the second law, only 151 of the 320 companies concerned had distributed 20 percent of the projected 49 percent of the stock by 1977. See R. Graham, "Iran: The Illusion of Power," N.Y., 1979, p 95. As for profit-sharing, it was confined to the irregular payment of bonuses to some workers.
12. Ibid., p 89.
13. In response to the law on the public distribution of stock, in summer and fall 1975 Iranian businessmen quickly transferred around 2 billion dollars (or 10 percent of the oil revenues for that year) abroad (see F. Halliday, op. cit., p 155).
14. Ibid., p 183.
15. Ibid., p 184.
16. "Results of the 1976 Population Census," Tehran, 1976, p 5.

17. F. Kazemi, "Poverty and Revolution in Iran. The Migrant, Urban Marginality and Politics," N.Y., 1980, p 14.
18. F. Halliday, op. cit., p 185.
19. A. Aghajanian, "The Economic Achievement of Rural Migrant Workers in an Iranian City," INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF MODERN SOCIOLOGY, 1978, vol 8, No 1, p 129.
20. F. Halliday, op. cit., p 190.
21. Ibid.
22. in Tabriz, for example, the price of land rose from 5,000 rials per square meter in 1971 to 45,000 in 1974, in Kerman it rose from 2,000 in 1959 to 15,000 in 1974, and in Rasht it rose from 20 rials in 1969 to 2,000 in 1974 (see R. Graham, op. cit., pp 88-89).
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p 221.
25. S. L. Agayev, op. cit., p 304.

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CSO: 1807/221

SECOND ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF ORIENTALISTS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 121-127

[Report by A. E. Azarkh, Ye. A. Birgauz, Ye. M. Medvedev and V. M. Solntsev on conference of Orientalists in Baku on 25-28 May 1983]

[Excerpts] The conference held from 25 through 28 May in Baku was attended by scholars from Orientology centers and higher academic institutions in many union and autonomous republics and by scholars from socialist countries and some Asian states.*

The conference was called to order by Academician Ye. M. Primakov, chairman of the All-Union Orientalists' Association and director of the Oriental Studies Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences. A welcoming speech was presented by First Secretary K. M. Bagirov of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan. He mentioned Soviet Azerbaijan's close connection with the establishment of the science of Orientology in our country. The First Congress of Peoples of the East was held here in 1920 on the initiative of V. I. Lenin and defined much of the new content and political purpose of Soviet Orientology. K. M. Bagirov told of his republic's great interest in the development of Oriental Studies.

Academician Ye. M. Primakov presented a report on "Soviet Orientology and Its Current Objectives."**

[For the texts of Bagirov's and Primakov's speeches, as published in Baku VYSHKA in Russian on 26 May 1983 on pages 1-2, see the USSR REPORT: POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS No 1452, JPRS 84225, 30 August 1983, pages 35-53]

The work of the conference was conducted in four sections dealing with socio-economic affairs, political and ideological affairs, philology and culture, and history and the study of source materials. Around 170 reports and speeches were presented.

* The First All-Union Conference of Orientalists was held in 1957.

** See Ye. M. Primakov, "Current Objectives of Soviet Orientology," NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 5, p 3.

The section on socioeconomic affairs (discussion led by G. K. Shirokov) concentrated on problems in the socioeconomic development of the newly liberated Asian countries and the distinctive features of their status in the world capitalist economy. These problems were the subject of G. K. Shirokov's report on "Structural and Cyclical Crises of Present-Day Capitalism and the Developing Countries" and "Socioeconomic Changes and the Development Strategy of Eastern Countries," A. I. Dinkevich's report on "Neocolonialism and the Development Strategy of Newly Liberated States," V. G. Rastyannikov's report on "The Periphery of the World Capitalist Economy: Conflicts in the Multi-Levelled Economy," R. N. Andreasyan's report on "The Energy Aspect of Development Strategy and the Problem of Oil Prices" and G. I. Chufrin's report on "Problems in the Economic Integration of the Southeast Asian Countries" (all from the IV [Oriental Studies Institute] of the USSR Academy of Sciences).

The speakers said that the course of development in the newly liberated countries had given rise to a dual economy, in which two sectors function--contemporary and traditional--and differ in terms of the nature of their productive forces and production relations and in the degree of reproductive relations between them. Furthermore, V. G. Rastyannikov said, the economic growth of developing countries is distinguished by the increased concentration of economic potential, resting on an industrial system of productive forces and corresponding forms of economic activity in relatively limited "seats of growth," while the "periphery" with its extreme population density and prevalence of pre-industrial forms of labor remains in a semistagnant state. Under these conditions, according to G. K. Shirokov, the distinctive features of capitalist development are the possibility of the simultaneous development and coexistence of different forms of capitalist enterprises, belonging to different stages, and a constant increase in government participation in economic development. The scales of this process, according to A. I. Dinkevich, have no parallels in history, including the industrial revolution in the West. From 30 to 45 percent of national income is now redistributed through a system of government participation and control, and in some countries the figure is much higher.

When the status of the developing countries in the world capitalist economy is being analyzed, it would be wrong to view their forms and degrees of dependence as something constant and invariable. In particular, their status was changed considerably by the structural and cyclical crises in the world capitalist economy in the 1970's and 1980's. The effects of these crises, as G. K. Shirokov pointed out, can be divided into short-range and long-range. Over the short range, slower development in the imperialist countries meant a relative, and in some cases absolute, reduction of the demand for the resources of developing countries. Over the long range, the crises gave world capitalist centers an incentive to expand sales markets in the developing countries. The changing nature of imperialism's resource dependence (particularly the reduction of demand for many types of raw materials) promoted the differentiation of developing countries. Countries whose raw material exports were gradually reduced were excluded from international division of labor.

Oil and its influence on the world economy represented another of the major topics of discussion. R. N. Andreasyan examined the policy of the OPEC

countries and their relations with the Western countries and Japan and with developing countries. He said that the energy crisis is still one of the most pressing problems of the developing countries. In 1980 the majority of these countries spent a total of 50 billion dollars on liquid fuel imports, which was almost equivalent to their total positive balance of payments (48 billion dollars). The speaker suggested that the average annual rate of increase in oil prices would not keep up with the rate of inflation, that oil-exporting countries with relatively small revenues and large loans would have to lower their rate of economic development, that the export of surplus petrodollars to the West would decrease and that the status of oil-importing developing countries would improve slightly.

G. I. Chufurin analyzed the activities of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and listed the strong and weak points of the economic integration of newly liberated countries. H. Grinig (GDR) analyzed theoretical aspects of underdevelopment, and P. Farkas (Hungary) assessed criteria used in the categorization and differentiation of developing countries.

Several of the reports in this section dealt with the present state and future development of Soviet relations with independent Asian countries. As K. P. D'yachenko noted in his speech and V. M. Pavlov pointed out in his theses (both from the NIIETS [Scientific Research Institute of Economic and Trade Relations] of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations), now the Soviet Union is aiding these countries in all sectors of the national economy. New forms of cooperation have come into being as a result of the improvement of economic relations with the developing countries. The most promising are cooperation in the form of participation by Soviet organizations in joint production societies, cooperation in construction projects on a contracted basis and economic relations based on production cooperatives. The cooperation of CEMA countries with states with a socialist orientation and the USSR's participation in the training of personnel for developing countries were discussed in speeches by N. A. Ushakova and M. I. Strepetova (both from the IEMSS [Economics of the World Socialist System Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences).

The role and characteristics of participation by various republics and regions of the USSR in economic relations with Asian and African countries were discussed at section meetings. This was the subject of the speeches by G. Alibeyli and Sh. Shukyurov (INBSV [Peoples of the Near and Middle East Institute], Azerbaijan SSR Academy of Sciences) on "The Azerbaijan SSR's Place in the Soviet Union's Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation with Countries of the Near and Middle East," by T. Sammarov (Tashkent State University) on "Soviet Uzbekistan in the USSR's Economic Cooperation with Developing Asian and African Countries," by M. Aydogdyyev (History Institute, Turkmen SSR Academy of Sciences) on "Constant and Invariable Policy," by V. P. Chichkanov (IEI [Institute of Economic Research], Far Eastern Scientific Center, USSR Academy of Sciences) on "The Augmentation of the Soviet Far East's Role in the Development of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between the USSR and the Developing Pacific Countries" and by Sh. B. Chimitdorzhiev (BION [Buryat Institute of Social Sciences], Siberian Department, USSR Academy of Sciences) on "Soviet Buryatiya's Economic and Cultural Contacts with the Mongolian People's Republic."

Several reports dealt with specific Asian and African countries and regions--reports by G. D. Sukharchuk (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) on China's current economic problems, by A. A. Aliyeva and E. A. Gulevskiy (both from the INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences) on the capitalist transformation of the socioeconomic structures of Turkey and Iran, by Yu. M. Ivanov (IMRD [International Workers' Movement Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences) on trends in the development of small-scale production in the African countries, by L. A. Fridman and V. A. Mal'yantsev (ISAA [Asia and Africa Institute], Moscow State University) on the socioeconomic development strategy of Algeria, by J. Balagy (Hungary) on Turkey's economic development in the 1970's and 1980's, and by L. V. Goncharov (Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) on the socioeconomic differentiation of African countries south of the Sahara.

In the section on political and ideological affairs (discussion led by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. F. Kim), V. F. Li (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) listed a number of criteria in his report on "Comprehensive Criteria for the Classification of Political Parties in the Developing Countries": indicators of the form and content of political struggle; data on the sociopolitical essence of ideological platforms; principles and methods of exercising political leadership; the nature of the social base and the structural features of political parties; the type of political culture; the direction of foreign policy activity.

During the debates following this report, some pertinent aspects of political theory and practice were discussed and suggestions were made to supplement and clarify the classification system described in the report. For example, I. B. Red'ko (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) added criteria pertaining to the genesis and evolution of party political structures. Sh. A. Tagiyeva (INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences) addressed the same matter.

The activities of communist parties in Eastern countries were the subject of speeches by N. O. Oganessian (IV, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences) and N. Yonkov (Bulgaria). N. O. Oganessian believes it is wrong to contrast revolutionary democratic parties to communist ones and he cited events of recent years to support his argument. N. Yonkov spoke of the difficulties and weaknesses in the work of communist parties in the Arab East and the complex sociopolitical situation of the 1970's and 1980's. P. M. Pak (Social Sciences Institute, CPSU Central Committee) said that the chief cause of the crisis of the national liberation movement's petty bourgeois leadership was the transformation of the social structure, which sometimes signals a transition from a national-revolutionary to a national-reformist policy.

A. V. Meliksetov (Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs) mentioned the need to use the actual experience of socialist Asian countries when theories about the socialist orientation are being formulated. It would be wrong to assess processes occurring in countries with this orientation only on the basis of program declarations and with no consideration for political practices and socioeconomic realities. These realities, Yu. M. Garushyants (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) stressed in his speech, testify that socialist construction in an underdeveloped country is often connected with the danger of several ideological and political losses

and metamorphoses, including the cult of personality as a system of political thought and behavior, the spread of ultra-leftist and nationalist views and the degeneration of the party into something like a religious organization. The political problems of the socialist orientation were also the subject of the speech by B. Doubrava (CSSR).

As for the categorization of countries with differing sociopolitical aims, K. M. Truyevtsev (ION [Institute of Social Sciences], CPSU Central Committee) categorizes the revolutionary-democratic regimes in the Arab East as Nasserist, Baathist and a category with increasing similarities to Marxism. A. E. Azarkh (IMEMO [World Economics and International Relations Institute], USSR Academy of Sciences) divides the state-capitalist regimes in South and Southeast Asia into leftist-centrist and moderate or rightist-centrist ones. In his opinion, state-capitalist regimes still have considerable potential for social maneuvering within the country and strong positions in the international arena. M. A. Cheshkov (IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences) suggested in his theses that politics in the developing countries be analyzed as the "coalition type," which corresponds in the social sphere to macroclasses (social conglomerates) resulting from the convergence of various socioeconomic levels on the basis of primary production relations. In the developing society there is a tendency toward the formation of two macroclasses: the dominant class and the laboring class.

The political problems of specific countries were described in a number of speeches. For example, I. A. Latyshev (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) described the role of the institution of the monarchy in Japanese politics. The domestic and foreign problems of the Afghan revolution were the subject of speeches by M. A. Babakhodzhayev (IV, Uzbek SSR Academy of Sciences), P. O. Smirnov (SNION [Social Sciences Research Center], AzSSR Academy of Sciences) and V. S. Korgun (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences). The major aspects of the Iranian revolution were examined by A. I. Shamida (INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences), Z. Z. Abdullayev (Azerbaijan State University) and R. A. Seidov (INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences).

Pertinent aspects of religion and nationalism were discussed in reports on ideological affairs. L. R. Polonskaya (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) stressed in her report on "Religion and Its Influence on the Ideological and Political Struggle in the Developing Asian and African Countries" that the struggle between two basic tendencies--religious and secular--which is common to the development of all spiritual life in the East, is of a cyclical nature. Furthermore, the religious tendency has generally become stronger during periods of crisis. On the one hand, ruling circles turn to religion in an attempt to create national models of development, based on traditional religious values and institutions; on the other, religion often becomes the spiritual focus of sociopolitical opposition on the lowest levels. As a result, both progressive and conservative ideas are inherent in religious theories in varying proportions.

A. B. Davidson (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) stressed in his report on "The Role of Ethnic Problems in Politics and Public Life in the Foreign East" that the struggle over the issue of the "state nationality" can now be regarded as the key to ethnosocial relations. This is directly related to the overall

sociopolitical development of the country. For this reason, in some countries the slogan of a single "state nationality" has become a propaganda screen behind which the dominant strata of the strongest ethnic group can redistribute financial and political privileges in their own favor.

The report on "Ethnic Processes in the Middle East," compiled by a group of authors under the supervision of O. I. Giginayshvili (IV, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences), illustrates the process by which a single "state nationality" is formed in the Middle East. In each country, this process has been counterbalanced by ethnic consolidation: both inside and outside the Muslim religious community. Ruling circles try to make use of the state propaganda machine, an official state language and an assimilation policy to prevent the disintegration of the Muslim community and to intensify the struggle against progressive forces by assuring the masses that they belong to a single and indivisible nationality with no internal class or ethnic conflicts.

The relationship between Islam and nationalism was analyzed by E. Yu. Gasanova (INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences) with specific reference to Turkey, and by D. M. Anarkulova (IV, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences) with reference to Iran. T. B. Gasanov (INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences) examined two tendencies in Arab nationalism: conservative and progressive. Ye. A. Birgauz (IMEMO, USSR Academy of Sciences) presented a model illustrating the connection between official political ideology and the mass consciousness, describing it from the standpoint of content, structure, genesis, functions and outlook. A. M. Reshetov (Ethnography Institute, Leningrad Branch, USSR Academy of Sciences) and I. A. Mal'kovskaya (Friendship of Peoples University imeni Patrice Lumumba) examined the important and little-researched problem of socio-psychological factors in the social consciousness, and particularly in ethnic awareness, the motivation of social actions and the connection between political choice and cognitive processes.

Foreign policy matters were discussed widely in this section. In his report on "New Features of American Foreign Policy and the International Situation in Asia," A. I. Chicherov (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) stressed that the U.S. administration is making use of the substantial "conflict potential" of various Asian countries and the growing "mini-power centers" in this region in its strategy of "rigid confrontation" with the USSR on the global and regional levels. The author mentioned the creation of the "central command" and the vigorous implementation of the "Reagan option" in the Middle East among the most important recent U.S. actions in this context. T. L. Shaumyan (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) analyzed India's contribution to the achievement of peace and stability in South Asia. I. D. Zvagel'skaya, V. I. Nosenko and V. V. Ozoling (all from the IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) discussed current problems in the Middle East settlement process. The causes, nature and stages of the Lebanese conflict in 1975-1983 were analyzed by N. O. Oganessian.

The following issues were analyzed during the discussion of foreign policy subject matter: Soviet relations with Asian countries (I. S. Kazakevich, IV, USSR Academy of Sciences), the Kampuchean problem (G. I. Chufirin), the Iran-Iraq conflict (G. Z. Aliyev, INBSV, AzSSR Academy of Sciences), the situation in the Middle East (L. I. Medvedko, PRAVDA), the current situation in the movement for nonalignment (F. Vykhodil, CSSR) and the activity of the AAPSO (K. K. Kozhakhmetov, Kazakh State University).

The work of the section on history and the study of source materials (discussion led by Academician Z. M. Buniyatov of the AzSSR Academy of Sciences) was conducted in subsections on history, the study of source materials, and archaeology. The subject matter of the history reports was concentrated around three main themes: the nature of the structural development of Eastern countries in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the classification and evolution-related characteristics of Asian cities, and government and ideology. The last was the subject of reports on social movements in the East (V. L. Larin, Vladivostok; M. Kh. Geydarov, History Institute, AzSSR Academy of Sciences). The reports reflected the arguments over the principles of dividing Eastern history into ancient and medieval periods, particularly in connection with the history of the cities. For example, the discussion leader in the history subsection, K. Z. Ashrafiyan (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences), presented a report on the pre-industrial city in Asia, based on traditional ideas about the sequence of two antagonistic structures in the pre-colonial period. L. B. Alayev (IV, USSR Academy of Sciences) proposed a new theory about the transformation of the slaveowner structure (for example, in the first half of the first millennium B.C. in India). Ye. I. Kychanov (IV, Leningrad Branch, USSR Academy of Sciences) summarized the results of a group research project, concluding that slavery in the East was widespread in the Middle Ages and was quite similar to the slavery of antiquity. The problem of personal dependence was discussed in reports by M. A. Dandamayev (IV, Leningrad Branch, USSR Academy of Sciences) and Ye. K. Sarkisyan (IV, Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences).

The aspects of the history of Eastern cities discussed by speakers displayed the known similarity of urban structures in various regions that indicates common levels and paths of evolution. Differences in approaches to the continuity of the Eastern city, however, were also pointed out (Ye. M. Medvedev, ISAA, Moscow State University), stemming from the recognition or non-recognition of the replacement of the slaveholding structure with a feudal one. It is indicative that questions connected with the theory of the historical process were raised in reports dealing with specific historical subject matter. Reports on the Caucasus and Central Asia were presented by K. K. Kutsiya (IV, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences), A. B. Nuriyev (Baku), V. A. Bayburtyan (Yerevan Pedagogical Institute) and V. Z. Piriyeu and I. A. Babayev (both from the History Institute, AzSSR Academy of Sciences). N. B. Kochakova (Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) discussed the evolution of states in pre-colonial Tropical Africa. Debates indicated the importance of studying traditional forms of public awareness, ancient and medieval institutions and doctrines for an understanding of contemporary sociopolitical thought in the East. The report by Z. G. Lapina (ISAA, Moscow State University) was particularly interesting in this context. The multiple functions of religion, which in pre-bourgeois society constituted an official ideology promoting the establishment and development of the state, were given serious attention (E. A. Grantovskiy, IV, USSR Academy of Sciences, and M. G. Khvedelidze, History Institute, Georgian SSR Academy of Sciences). The report by G. Gaibov (IV, Tajik SSR Academy of Sciences) on the changes of Central Asian place names during the Arab conquests was extremely interesting. The ethnic history of ancient Azerbaijan was the subject of reports by Yu. B. Yusufov and I. Sh. Dzhevadov (both from the History Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences).

At the conclusion of the conference, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences G. F. Kim spoke of the activities of the All-Union Orientalists' Association, and section discussion leaders analyzed the results of the discussions and debates.

Ye. M. Primakov noted the productive nature of the conference and thanked the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and republic leaders for their concern and hospitality.

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ACADEMIC SESSION ON AFRICAN CULTURE

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 127-134

[Report by V. N. Vologdina, Yu. M. Il'in and S. L. Milyavskaya on out-of-town session of USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on African Affairs from 11 through 14 May 1983 in Leningrad]

[Excerpts] An out-of-town session of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on African Affairs was held in Leningrad from 11 through 14 May 1983 to commemorate the 80th birthday of corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences D. A. Ol'derogge, one of the founders of Soviet African studies.* The theme of the session was "The History of African Culture. Problems in the Cultural and Scientific Development of Africa Today." The session was attended by representatives of academic centers and universities in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Vilnius, Yerevan, Tbilisi, Ashkhabad, Odessa, Kazan and other cities.

The plenary meeting, organized by the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on African Affairs in conjunction with the Ethnography Institute, the Africa Institute, Leningrad State University and the All-Union Geographic Society, was called to order by Academician Yu. V. Bromley, who discussed D. A. Ol'derogge's contribution to the study of African culture.

An introductory speech was presented by corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences An. A. Gromyko, director of the Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences, who noted that the people of Africa have a rich and unique culture: The ancient and medieval civilizations of the continent--the Nok, Meroe, Aksuma, Ife and Benina cultures and others--made a perceptible contribution to the common heritage of world civilization. Long years of colonial oppression inflicted irreparable damage on the African cultures. Spiritual decolonization, the rebirth of the best traditions and widespread cultural education in the interest of progressive socioeconomic and political development are the primary objectives of the majority of African leaders.

Cultural uniqueness, the cultural heritage and traditional culture have been examined and discussed widely at various national, regional and international

* For a list of D. A. Ol'derogge's main works of 1966-1982, see pp 209-210.

forums. In particular, these matters were given considerable attention at the world conference on cultural policy in Mexico in 1982.

There is a complex dialectical relationship between culture and social development. Cultural policy depends on the nature of socioeconomic relations: the multileveled nature of African states, the diversity of their social structures, the domination of some economies by transnational corporations, incomplete processes of class formation, ethnic pluralism, acute inter-ethnic conflicts and many other factors have an indisputable effect on the nature and speed of spiritual decolonization and cultural reforms. In turn, cultural reforms, particularly in the sphere of education, national personnel training, the eradication of illiteracy and the ideological and political education of the population aid in the implementation of plans for the economic and social development of society.

The ideological struggle in today's world, including Africa, extends to the sphere of culture. It is this sphere that is regarded by Western politicians as the most favorable one for the dissemination of bourgeois ideas with the aim of consolidating the neocolonial influence.

Cultural reform programs in a number of African states, particularly those with a socialist orientation, have been resisted by so-called "traditionalists" who predict the impending "cultural death" of Africa and try to substitute religion for objective processes of socioeconomic and cultural development as a basis for social cohesion and unity.

Several valuable studies of the African culture and the cultural policy of African states during their years of independence have been compiled in the Soviet Union. The study of these matters has been of paramount concern to corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences Dmitriy Alekseyevich Ol'derogge, renowned Soviet African scholar, philologist, ethnographer and historian. After congratulating the guest of honor on being awarded the Order of Friendship Among Peoples, An. A. Gromyko stressed that this order is conferred upon consistent internationalists who make a substantial contribution to stronger friendship among peoples. V. A. Ol'derogge has performed great services in African studies, the training of Soviet African scholars and national African personnel and the cultural and scientific development of Africa. With his works on history, ethnography, linguistics, philology and culture, D. A. Ol'derogge laid the foundations of the Soviet science of African studies, promoted a broader understanding of the structure of African traditional society and linguistic problems and took a new approach to the resolution of many cardinal problems in African studies. Hundreds of his students--specialists in African history, ethnography, philology and linguistics--graduated from the "Ol'derogge school" and are working in research centers in the USSR and many socialist countries. Source materials on African ethnography and history have been published under his supervision, including Arab, Chinese, Graeco-Roman, Hausa and Swahili materials. D. A. Ol'derogge has performed great international services by participating in a number of archaeological-ethnographic and linguistic expeditions on the continent and developing a national written language for Mali. His contribution to world science is appreciated by the international scientific community: He is a member of the International Africa Institute in London, the Academic

Association of African Scholars in England and the African Scholars Society in France, a corresponding member of the British Academy and the Overseas Science Academy in Paris, received an honorary doctorate from Warsaw University, and so forth.

The guest of honor was congratulated by Academician B. V. Piotrovskiy and representatives of more than 30 academic institutes and universities in the country, as well as representatives of African scholars in the GDR and CSSR. As the chairman of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with Asian and African Countries, An. A. Gromyko awarded the guest of honor medals of the Union of Soviet Societies for Friendship with Foreign Countries and the committee for solidarity.

The section of "Cultural and Scientific Development in Today's Africa" (discussion led by Ye. A. Tarabrin) was attended by 30 representatives of academic establishments and VUZ's in the country who discussed problems in cultural and scientific development--enlightenment, education, the training of national African personnel and the role of cultural and scientific contacts in Soviet-African relations.

Current problems in African cultural development were the subject of several reports. Speakers (A. B. Davidson, "Contradictory Aspects of Cultural Interaction in Southern Africa Today"; V. S. Yag'ya, "Cultural Construction in Ethiopia"; I. T. Kamagoshchina, "Cultural Construction in Nigeria"; Y. Yu. Lasauskas, "Some Aspects of Cultural Construction in Developing Countries"; N. I. Kikvadze, "The 'Cultural Maintenance' of FRG Neocolonialism in Africa"; and others) noted the devastating effect of colonialism on the traditional culture of the Africans. N. I. Vysotskaya stressed in her report on "Cultural Construction in Africa: Problems of Traditionalism and Tribalism" that the resolution of problems in cultural construction is part of the job of reconstructing and renovating African society, often called the process of modernization. A question arises in connection with these processes: How should the institutions of the past and the requirements of the present, traditionalist programs and "European rationalism," be combined? Attempts to solve this problem can be traced in the cultural development of Senegal, Zaire, Zambia, Tanzania and Madagascar. N. I. Vysotskaya said that the view of cultural construction and culture itself as a basis for the self-determination of society and a unique guarantee of its viability is prevalent among members of the African intelligentsia. As a rule, the approach to these matters is always connected in one way or another with the attitude toward traditionalism and tradition. Traditionalism can be absolutized (the ideas of the "African personality," "African exclusivity" and "African ideological independence") and represent one type of nationalist outlook (in Zaire, for example). In this case, respect for tradition acquires reactionary features. For progressive and truly patriotic forces in Africa, respect for tradition is a means of finding progressive methods of organizing ethnic integration. Respect for tradition can also be the result of attempts to use the experience of society for revolutionary purposes and for the revolutionary mobilization of the masses. Attempts of this kind can be seen in Madagascar, where the fokonolona--a type of peasant communal organization--is now being used on a broad scale. Problems in cultural construction are being resolved in the

complex atmosphere of a struggle for stronger internal consolidation and in the absence of definite national ties. In connection with this, tribalism, which has retained its influence in all of the countries of Tropical Africa, is still impeding cultural construction, which necessitates a thoroughly substantiated approach to ethnic problems and the thorough consideration of the cultural heritage and specific features of economic communities on all levels, united within a single state.

The experience in the resolution of problems in the USSR, a multinational state in which ethnic communities (nationalities, ethnic groups, etc.) were on different levels of economic, social, cultural and spiritual development, can be of indisputable interest to the African countries during the organization of cultural construction. The assimilation of the theoretical premises of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, particularly with regard to traditionalism and tradition, can be of great importance to Africans. A creative approach to the principles of this doctrine can enrich the methods and means of solving problems in cultural construction in the African countries.

The interaction of tradition with present practices in various spheres of African sociopolitical and cultural life was discussed to some degree in the majority of reports. Several speakers pointed out differences in the cultural policy of African countries. The political orientation of states unavoidably influences the nature of the developing culture. Cultural policy in the countries of Tropical Africa with a capitalist orientation is acquiring more and more nationalist features, reflected in the attempt to preserve not only the stereotypes of traditional African culture, but also social-class differences, including ethnic ones. This is also the source of all the differences in concepts of African culture. This was the subject of Yu. N. Vinokurov's report on "Problems in Establishing the National Culture in the Countries of Tropical Africa with a Capitalist Orientation."

A. D. Savateyev ("The Role of African States with a Socialist Orientation in Cultural Development"), L. E. Gankin ("Mass Culture in the Countries of Tropical Africa") and other speakers noted that the principle of cultural democracy is being implemented consistently in African countries with a socialist orientation, where considerable attention is being given to the cultural education of the popular masses. Corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences V. G. Solodovnikov presented a report on "Amilcar Cabral and His Views on the Role of Culture in the African Revolution."

Culture and science now constitute one of the most important spheres of the African countries' international relations. The basic areas of Soviet-African cultural cooperation--contacts in enlightenment, education, science, art and literature and the exchange of cultural artifacts and information--were discussed in the reports by Ye. A. Tarabrin on "The Role of Cultural and Scientific Contacts in Soviet-African Relations (Theory)," M. V. Rayt on "Some Aspects of USSR Cultural Cooperation with African Countries" and others. The training of African national personnel in the Belorussian SSR was the subject of a report by I. P. Primanchuk (Belorussian SSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education). The study of the experience in cultural construction in the Central Asian republics is acquiring particular importance for African countries. This was the subject of the reports by D. Seidkuliye

(Turkmen SSR Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education) on "The Significance of the Turkmen Experience in Cultural Construction and the Training of National Personnel for Developing African Countries" and by A. M. Sakhatmuradov (Ashkhabad State University) on "The Significance of the Turkmen Experience of Cultural Revolution and Scientific Progress for Developing African and Asian Countries." The USSR's contribution to the training of African national scientific personnel was described in the report by Yu. M. Il'in, who presented a brief analysis of "Indicators of Doctoral and Candidates' Dissertations on African Subject Matter Defended in the USSR in 1935-1980," prepared by the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on African Affairs and the academy Africa Institute.

Most of the reports presented in the section on "History, Ethnography, Traditional Culture and Art" (discussion led by L. D. Yablochkov and V. V. Matveyev) dealt with problems in the interaction of traditional and contemporary cultures in Africa and specific aspects of the traditional culture--art, religion, the epic, etc. A report on "The Traditional Art of Tropical Africa (Sculpture and Masks)" was presented by An. A. Gromyko.*

According to several speakers, some elements of the traditional African culture, representing a synthesis of the material and spiritual cultures, have been retained and still exist, although usually in a modified form. They still play a significant role in various spheres of political and social life--cults, rites, rituals, economic forms, etc.

N. M. Girenko's hypotheses about the multidimensional space and time characteristics of the social system led to a debate on historical forms of African social organizations. V. A. Popov questioned the existence of "primitive states" in precolonial West Africa, where there was no concept of class exploitation, and suggested the term "para-polis" societies. N. B. Kochakova discussed the incomplete development of civilizations in the Niger River basin. V. V. Bocharov described the traditional forms of government that still exist in independent African countries, political standards influenced by the precolonial past, a knowledge of which aids in the correct interpretation of sociopolitical events and processes in the contemporary African society.

On the basis of field research findings, V. R. Arsen'yev and V. V. Naumkin demonstrated how the traditional way of life is combined with contemporary living conditions. V. R. Arsen'yev noted the specific role of hunting societies in the political structure of the Republic of Mali and said that the Bambara societies, which were connected with traditional institutions of authority for centuries, have not only been preserved in Mali but also unite representatives of various government strata and the traditional elite. V. V. Naumkin reported on the comprehensive academy expedition to Socotra Island. Production relations here have been changed by increased migration, the decline of crafts and changing religious beliefs. A. A. Bol'shakov discussed the current research into the extinct population of the Canary

* The basic premises of An. A. Gromyko's report were reflected in an article on this topic in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1983, No 3, pp 40-50 [not translated by JPRS].

Islands, its anthropological features and its way of life. The significance of the music of Tropical Africa was discussed by L. O. Golden. S. Ya. Perzina reported on the origins of the name Sundiaty--the Mandingo people's historical hero. She analyzed underlying themes in the epic "Sogolon, Mother of Sundiaty" and of rock paintings and masks and concluded that there had been a single ancient Saharan-Sudanese cultural complex. I. Ye. Sinitsina ("Shakespeare Through African Eyes") noted the academic value of comparisons of European and African interpretations of Shakespeare's "Hamlet." She cited the findings of English ethnographers to explain the motives of the Tiv community's perception and interpretation of each element of Shakespeare's tragedy. V. S. Koshelev (Minsk State University) discussed the formation of public organizations and the press in Egypt at the end of the 19th century, the Masonic order and the beginning of the national liberation struggle. Traditional Armenian-African cultural contacts were the subject of the report by K. Kh. Samvelyan (IV [Oriental Studies Institute], Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences), in which he told of the Armenian intelligentsia's influence on cultural development in Egypt and the Armenian settlements in Northeast Africa. M. B. Cornung's report was interesting in the context of the debates on cultural and scientific development. He views African numismatics as a field of science closely related to this matter and as a field of African studies in the broad sense of the term. The speaker noted the productive nature of the systematic study of precolonial, colonial and post-colonial African coins.

Several reports dealt with religion as a reflection of the traditional culture and, what is most important, with religion's role in the establishment of the African state. Yu. M. Kobishchanov said that religions in African class societies are generally syncretic because they include elements of highly developed religions, including the world religions. Sometimes the extension of Islam and Christianity to the sphere of culture promotes the further cohesion of African ethnic groups in inter-ethnic cultural communities. Elucidating the history of religious beliefs during the centuries of cultural development in Africa, the speaker suggested a new interpretation of the process by which religions spread through the continent. The penetration of African countries by Islam was the subject of the report by L. I. Shaydullina (Kazan State University) and A. G. Pondopulo (IV, Academy of Sciences), which pointed out changes in Islamization processes in Africa in connection with the increasing influence of the Islamic factor on world politics, and the appearance of elements of the Arab-Islamic culture in Tropical Africa as a result of internal cultural development. As D. A. Ol'derogge correctly stressed in his speech, however, the distinctive features of African Islam, which had a much more complex process of development than many researchers imagine, have not been researched in full as yet.

We cannot comment on all of these reports and will simply say that they dealt with much that was new and interesting in the study of such important matters as the ethnic origins of African people, the development of African civilizations, the system of social relations and sociopolitical relations, the establishment of national African historical studies, the analysis of written source materials and others (the reports by Yu. K. Poplinskiy, V. A. Popov, I. I. Filatova, V. V. Matveyev, V. B. Mirimanov and others). The concluding speech in this section was presented by D. A. Ol'derogge.

The out-of-town session of the USSR Academy of Sciences Academic Council on African Affairs demonstrated the profound interest that African scholars in the Soviet Union have taken in African cultural development and represented a definite contribution to the further development of the science of African Studies.

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ORIENTAL INSTITUTE HOLDS CONFERENCE ON AUSTRALIA, OCEANIA

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 137-138

[Report on 14th Conference on Australia and Oceania in Oriental Studies Institute on 19 and 20 May 1983]

[Text] The 14th scientific conference on Australia and Oceania was held on 19 and 20 May of this year. Reports and speeches were presented by representatives from various scientific centers in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Tbilisi, Yerevan and Rostov-on-Don.

In an introductory speech Professor K. V. Malakhovskiy, chief of the Department of Pacific Affairs, enumerated noteworthy successes in Pacific research. The political and economic affairs of Pacific countries are being researched more thoroughly. Some examples are the collective work "Tikhookeanskiy regionalizm. Kontseptsii i realii" [Pacific Regionalism. Theory and Reality], the result of joint work by researchers from the institutes of Oriental Studies, U.S. and Canada Studies and the Far East; and A. Yu. Suchkov's "Syr'yevyye resursy Tikhookeanskikh stran i regional'nyye svyazi" [The Crude Resources of Pacific Countries and Regional Ties], V. P. Nikolayev's "Problemy stanovleniya i razvitiya nezavisimyykh stran Okeanii" [Problems in the Establishment and Development of the Independent Countries of Oceania], O. V. Zharova's "Avstraliyskiy leyborizm posle vtoroy mirovoy voyny" [The Australian Labor Party After World War II], L. G. Stefanchuk's "Sovremennoye vnesnepoliticheskoye polozheniye Novoy Zelandii" [New Zealand's Current Foreign Policy Position], B. B. Rubtsov's "Avstraliya i Okeaniya. Osobennosti razvitiya kapitalizma na sovremennom etape" [Australia and Oceania. Distinctive Features of Capitalist Development at the Current Stage] and A. S. Petrikovskaya's "Avstraliyskiy roman. Istoriya, tipologiya i sotsial'naya problematika" [The Australian Novel. History, Categorization and Social Subject Matter]. Interesting studies of the history, ethnography and literature of Australia and Oceania are being compiled in scientific centers in Leningrad, Kiev, Tbilisi and Vladivostok.

In a report on "The Struggle for United Action by the Trade Unions of the Asian Countries, Australia and Oceania," V. P. Kudinov (Moscow) discussed the joint struggle of trade unions against transnational corporations, the organization of the labor movement in the island states of the South Pacific and the relationship between the Asian and Pacific labor movement and the

international workers and communist movement. V. P. Nikolayev (Moscow) examined a new and little-researched matter in his report on "The Neocolonial Policy of Australia and New Zealand in Oceania"--the collective neocolonialism of these two countries. He directed attention to the need for the comprehensive study of forms and methods of neocolonial behavior by Australia and New Zealand in Oceania. A. S. Petrikovskaya (Moscow) underscored the importance of studying the countries of Oceania as the object of foreign cultural influence. A. Yu. Suchkov (Moscow) elucidated some aspects of the development of international economic relations in the Pacific region, including the crucial raw material problem, which is of a global nature and is an endogenic factor in the evolution of the Pacific sector of the world capitalist economy. The development of Australian-Japanese relations in 1970-1980 was the subject of the report by N. P. Chelintseva (Moscow). "The New Zealand Economy in the 1980's" was the subject of the report by B. B. Rubtsov (Moscow). I. I. Vasilevskaya (Moscow) analyzed Japan's strategy in the Asian Pacific and the developing countries of East Asia. V. B. Amirov (Moscow) examined new developments in the concentration of production and capital in Australia in the late 1970's and early 1980's. N. V. Gordeyeva (Moscow) described the state of the Australian economy in 1981-1982. A. V. Chuyko (Moscow) spoke of problems in Australian agricultural development. P. M. Ivanov (Moscow) reported on "J. E. Morrison and the Development of Australian Sinology." L. G. Stefanchuk (Moscow) concentrated on the role of parliament and the cabinet in New Zealand politics. I. V. Kovler (Moscow) described the main stages in the establishment of the New Zealand National Party. O. V. Zharova (Moscow) analyzed the political aims of the Australian Labor Party in 1950-1980: "democratic socialism," "economic planning" and the support of middle strata as well as the trade unions. She also discussed the rightward shift in party policy at the end of the 1970's. The nature and characteristics of Australia's colonial policy in New Zealand were the subject of the report by A. Ya. Massov (Leningrad). G. I. Kanevskaya (Vladivostok) discussed the immigration policy of Great Britain's Australian colonies in the second half of the 19th century. K. Yu. Bem (Moscow) examined German-Australian relations in 1938 with the aid of new documented facts. Some aspects of state-monopoly regulation in Australian agriculture were analyzed by L. S. Klevtsur (Moscow). Reports by ethnographers aroused great interest: N. A. Butinov's (Leningrad) "Shell Money in Melanesia," M. S. Butinova's (Leningrad) "Where Is Hawaiki?" O. Yu. Artemov's (Moscow) "Elements of Individual Specialization Among the Australian Aborigines," L. A. Abratyan's (Yerevan) "The Australian Wanderer Malpunga and the Exile Oedipus," Ya. V. Chesnov's (Moscow) "Differences and Similarities in Ethnocultural Processes in Oceania," I. K. Fedorova's (Leningrad) "Polynesian Navigation (According to Folklore)," D. D. Tumarkin's (Moscow) "From the History of Plans for the Development of the Macleay Coast (Based on New Archival Material)" and K. Yu. Meshko's (Moscow) "The Island as a Sacred Concept."

Literature was the subject of the reports by N. O. Zernetskaya (Kiev) on "The Theme of Struggle for Peace in the Works of C. S. Pritchard ('The Eternal Flame')," by N. G. Nanitashvili (Tbilisi) on "Literary Tradition in the Works of F. Sargesen," by V. I. Kotlyarova (Rostov-on-Don) on "'Personality Crisis' and the Novels of D. Cusack" and by Ye. V. Govor (Minsk) on "Sofiya Vitkovskaya and Her Trip to Australia."

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ANATOLIY GROMYKO ADDRESSES INSTITUTE COUNCIL ON SOVIET-AFRICAN TIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 138-139

[Report on address presented 8 June 1983 at session of academic council by An. A. Gromyko, institute director and corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] On 8 June 1983 institute Director An. A. Gromyko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, presented a report on "The Political Economic Aspects of African Studies" at a session of the academic council.

With a view to 26th CPSU Congress objectives, he pointed out the need for more active Soviet-African economic relations and directed attention to related fundamental problems. He also pointed out the need for more thorough analyses of capitalist political economics and production relations in the newly liberated countries. An. A. Gromyko also stressed the importance of studying socialist political economics, particularly such aspects as the connection between productive forces and production relations, the analysis of tendencies in the development of productive forces under the influence of the technological revolution, the study of ownership of the means of production as the cornerstone of socialism and the main factor of its existence, the more thorough study of theoretical aspects of the development of young African states, their more important role in world economics and politics, the natural laws governing their development and the prerequisites for their future development, and the study of forms of neocolonialism in Africa, particularly as reflected in the activities of transnational corporations.

A thorough understanding of socioeconomic processes in Africa and the distinctive features of international economic relations will require the study of the law of uneven capitalist development on the continent, combining an analysis of the state of affairs in Africa with an analysis of the world capitalist economy and world trade. The improvement of mutually beneficial economic cooperation by socialist countries with the newly liberated countries and the resistance of private capital's growing strength will be of great importance.

Imperialism's attempts to subjugate and exploit developing countries by dividing them up into raw material zones, An. A. Gromyko said, will lead to the accumulation of new conflicts between them, and these will influence the international situation in the 1980's.

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BURMESE RULING-PARTY JOURNAL CRITICIZED ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 143-150

[Review by A. S. Agadzhanian of PATI YEYA (PARTY LIFE), monthly journal of Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) Central Committee, published in Rangoon: "Some Ideological Problems on the Pages of the Burmese Journal PATI YEYA"]

[Excerpts] Discussions of theoretical aspects of ruling party ideology in the periodicals of developing countries are interesting not only because they pinpoint the sociopolitical orientation of a regime but also, in the broader context, because they serve as valuable material for the historian of social thought and culture. It is in this broader context that we will present the matter to the reader.

Three series of articles published under the subheading "Ideological Affairs" in PATI YEYA, the journal of the BSPP, in 1979-1982 are the object of our survey. This is a regular section of the magazine, and perhaps the most important because it reflects the official party viewpoint on the most general questions of ideological theory.¹ The value of this publication is also compounded by the fact that theoretical aspects of ideology are virtually never discussed in the English-language press and are mentioned rarely even in publications in Burmese. In this respect, the journal is a unique source.

In general, all three of the series selected for discussion--1) "The Use of the Middle Path" (No 2, 1979--No 10, 1980); 2) "What Is Ideology?" (No 11, 1980--No 2, 1981); 3) "The Guiding Ideology of the Lanzin Party" (No 3, 1981--No 7, 1982)--are addressed to BSPP members and are intended to raise the level of their theoretical training. The text of the articles is fairly complex: It contains many Pali terms (most of which are quite familiar to the Burmese with an average education) and philosophical maxims. It is true that the theoretical level is lowered somewhat by illustrations from Burmese reality, by slogans and by appeals to party members--for example, appeals for the suppression of the rebel movement, for the fulfillment of economic plans, etc.

Let us take a look at what we consider to be the most interesting problems these publications raise for researchers.

BSPP ideology and Buddhism: The problem of identifying and translating terms is connected with another extremely interesting phenomenon: Burmese

ideologists translated the majority of Western philosophical terms from English into Burmese with the aid of words taken from the Buddhist Pali terminology.⁵ As a result, these translations acquired religious overtones and, what is even more important, the meaning of the translated text was influenced strongly by Buddhist connotations.

This problem can be viewed in a broader context, which we will discuss only in part--Buddhism's place in BSPP ideology.

The fact that some Buddhist philosophical stereotypes were used in the ideology of the ruling group from 1962 on, and represented one of the sources of this ideology during its initial stages, can be demonstrated quite easily by a look at BSPP policy-planning documents. Nevertheless, official documents quite unequivocally describe party ideology as "purely secular" and "worldly."⁶ Confirmation of this can be found in one of the articles in question (1981, No 4), which is wholly devoted to religion and party views on religion. It stresses that the ideology ("tabotaya") of the party is "purely secular." Although the authors of the article defend the right of each individual to practice religion and believe in the afterlife, they regard people's vital needs as purely worldly and they therefore believe that state policy should concentrate on these earthly interests. Besides this, a distinction between this life and the next is necessary for the sake of national unity, "so that religious differences will not impede the attainment of common socialist goals." At the same time, many of the articles in question are permeated with the spirit of Buddhist ethics even when they do not contain Buddhist dogma in pure form. How can we explain this contradiction? And is it a contradiction?

One important fact is clear. When Burmese ideologists talk about the secular nature of state concepts, they do not use the term "Buddhism" ("buddha bada"--a phrase identical in meaning to "religion" in general), but the more general term "faith" ("youchi kogue bada maya"): consequently, they are not "excluding" Buddhism in general from this ideology, but simply its theological element, which is only a part of it. It would be impossible to completely ignore Buddhism, within the framework of which Burmese philosophical thought has been developing for many centuries, just as it would be impossible to completely sever all ties with cultural and historical tradition.

For this reason, it is not surprising that these articles are marked by such perceptible Buddhist features: This occurred not only because the majority of philosophical terms in Burmese are Pali terms, but also because some Burmese Buddhist elements were deliberately included in party doctrine and in the articles in question. Above all, there is the "law of the general variability, constant formation and transitory state of all living things." Besides this, there is the Buddhist cliché about the "four virtues" (love, sympathy, empathy and spiritual tranquility) and the "three vices" (greed, hatred and ignorance), connected with the belief in the dualism of good and evil in man (1981, No 4). It is interesting that the authors supplement these traditional "Buddhist" virtues and vices with new ones, taken from contemporary life--for example, they mention the vices of egotism, groveling, the exploitation of others, etc. (ibid.).

The authors of these articles give considerable attention to detailed explanations of the dogma of the "three worlds" (the inanimate world, the animate world and the world of change), which was set forth in brief in a BSPP policy-planning document back in 1963. This abstract and seemingly insignificant tenet is analyzed in five articles. All subsequent exposition of party doctrine is based on this tripartite division of nature.

The abundance of Palisms (or, more precisely, "Buddhisisms") and the numerous arguments presented from the Buddhist standpoint give some articles the characteristics of traditional Buddhist pessimism (the "frailty of the flesh" and the idea that "everything grows old and dies") and others a nuance of "total necessity," approaching fatalism.

But in these articles, just as in Burmese official ideology as a whole, we are dealing not only with the automatic inclusion of Buddhist elements (even in the latter case these elements acquire slightly different nuances due to the unfamiliar context), but also with deliberate attempts by Burmese ideologists to update some concepts and elements of Buddhist origin by synthesizing them with other, non-Buddhist ideas. The result is a group of syncretic offshoots which are given a more or less organic form by the ideologists. In essence, these examples illustrate another aspect of the same translation problem, but this time it concerns not the identification of terms, but the "translation" of whole concepts and ideological theories from the language of one culture to the language of another.

A characteristic example of this kind of "translation" is the frequency with which Burmese ideologists make references to the dialectical method, which they regard as the greatest achievement of European philosophical thought and with which they are trying to enrich their national philosophy. In these articles whole components of Buddhist dogma are used in the adaptation of dialectics and the dialectical method. As a result of this kind of identification, the syncretic, "Buddhisized" model of dialectics loses one significant feature, inherent in the European prototype--namely the emphasis on contradictions as the stimulant of development: Contradictions are not mentioned at all in these articles (although they are mentioned in official documents of the 1960's).

In dialectics, Burmese ideologists accept anything consistent with Buddhist philosophical tradition, associating it with three components of this tradition. They equate the three main laws of dialectics with the Buddhist law of "sanghara" (the variability, impermanence and transitory nature of existence); they translate "dialectical method" with the term "patikkasamupada,"⁷ which is the Buddhist term for the cause-and-effect chain of existence; they translate the phrase "dialectical path" with the term "madzimatipada"--the middle path. We can see how extensive and multifaceted a response dialectics evoked in the system of Buddhist philosophical views in the interpretation proposed by BSPP ideologists. As a result, "translated" into the language of the Burmese Buddhist culture, dialectics is converted--consciously or unconsciously--into something completely different.

Let us examine one such case of semantic change.

Dialectics and the concept of the "middle path": The Buddhist term "madzimapatipada," which became one of the common terms in Burmese social and philosophical thought of the independent period, is used in the title of one series of articles. This term is used in the Buddhist canon in connection with Buddha Gautama's decision to reject the path of total asceticism and the path of total materialism (excess wealth) and to take some kind of middle path to arrive at the truth. The concept of the "middle path" has been elaborated in Buddhist literature on the basis of this episode from Buddha's life and his decision.⁸

Burmese ideologists use this term, but in explanatory translations into English (in party documents and articles) it is called the "dialectical path" as well as the "middle path."⁹ The concept of the "middle path" has been used as an approximate analogue of the concept of "dialectics" only since the time when Ne Win took power. The term "middle path" was previously used in official ideology in its original, Buddhist sense. Since the word "path" was present in the traditional term, it was left in the English equivalent, resulting in a new phrase--"dialectical path"--which is not used in European philosophy. But something else is important here--namely that the first part of the term is equated with "dialectics": For Burmese ideologists, "staying in the middle" is dialectics.

It would be difficult to say whether the Burmese term was chosen to fit the Greek root or vice versa, but in any case this kind of identification has indisputable substantive as well as nominative significance. When the concept of the "middle" (or "dialectical") path was being elaborated, an attempt was made to integrate some of the important premises of the dialectical method, including the basic law and categories of dialectics. In spite of this, however, the concept has such distinctive features that it naturally cannot be regarded as a simple description of the dialectical method in the Burmese language.

The first article about the "middle path" (1979, No 2) explains the purpose of the entire series: "to elucidate various aspects connected with the correct use of the middle path" and "to explain some premises" whose vagueness complicates this "correct use." "The middle path," the authors say, "does not permit onesided devotion to any one individual, to any one sect (group or party--A. A.), to any one territory or to any one nationality. Its basis is objectivity." For this reason, the "middle path" is the path of neutrality or "nonalignment."¹⁰ The article then goes on to quote part of the BSPP Charter (1971), which says, in particular: "The middle path is a path free of extremes: It is distinguished by moderation. The opposite of the middle path is excessive tautness or excessive slackness, excess or insufficiency."¹¹ The interpretation of the middle path as something equidistant from extremes is the basis of this concept. The extremes avoided in this manner are, in the authors' interpretation, the opposites found in unity and struggle. It is here that the authors see the point at which the concept of the "middle path" converges with dialectics: The dialectical interaction of opposites (the term "contradictions" is still not used) results in change; the type of change depends on the forces "pulling backward" and the forces "pushing forward," and the latter can also be divided into "right and left"--"two different forces, each pushing in its own direction." The middle path, according to the authors, is the

"resultant" in which the process of change takes place. Consequently, movement along the middle path guards against "mistaken movements backward or to the right or left."

The authors who put forth the concept of the "middle path" quote from the party charter to clarify: "The middle path does not mean movement between right and wrong, between justice and injustice, between good and evil." According to them, the "middle path" is "truth, justice and good" and any extreme--that is, any failure to stay in the middle--is wrong, unjust and evil (1979, No 2).

The authors of several articles discuss dialectical categories, calling them "categories of the middle path." What is more, in general these authors present an accurate, although simplified interpretation of the categories of dialectical materialism. They examine, for example, the following pairs of categories: form and content (1980, No 4), substance and essence, inevitability and coincidence, freedom and necessity (1980, No 6) and others. The examples used in the examination of each category are mainly of two types: examples from nature and examples from the sphere of social phenomena. It is interesting that the latter are linked with specific problems in Burma today, and that this, according to the authors, is supposed to help clarify some aspects of BSPP policy.

For example, the article in which the categories of form and content are examined actually focuses on the relationship between the "basis and super-structure" in present-day Burma. "Form," the article says, "is the state of socialist democracy, and content is the basis of the socialist economy" (1980, No 4). Form and content are closely interrelated: "It is with the aid of reliance on the organizational form (that is, the 'socialist state'--A. A.) that the content (that is, the 'old, feudal-capitalist economy') is transformed and, conversely, it is in accordance with changes in content that actions are taken to change the form (ibid.). In reference to the "content of the socialist economy," the authors write: "The socialist economic system serves to satisfy the vital needs of not only the individual, the group, the organization, the class or the members of the party, but of all people" (ibid.).

When the authors discuss the categories of "substance" and "essence," they cite the following characteristic examples: 1) "The substance of the present era" in Burma is "socialist revolutionary reform," while the "essence" of the era consists of "various organizational processes," "various types of socialist construction" and efforts to "eradicate injustice"; 2) the "essence" of capitalism consists of "crisis, unemployment and the low standard of living of workers and peasants," and the "underlying substance is the domination of the majority by the exploiter class"; 3) the subversive activity of rebels is the essence, while the substance of this activity is "the prevention of socialist revolutionary changes in Burma" (1980, No 5).

When the authors analyze the category of possibility (1980, No 6), they focus on the difference between "immediate" and "long-range" possibilities. It is an "immediate" possibility for Burma to "use scientific methods of farming," select the most suitable strains of grain for various regions, etc. "There is

a long-range possibility for the development of the processing industry, based on various financial, human and intellectual resources...during the process of consumer goods production with the aid of agricultural raw materials." This is how the idea of "industrialization with reliance on agriculture" is illustrated.

In one article the category of freedom is called a perceived need (1980, No 8). The authors write that "freedom from a defective economic system" (that is, capitalism, judging from the context) is only possible when the need for its elimination is perceived.

When the authors analyze various dialectical categories or pairs of categories, they try to link their interpretation with the concept of the "middle path," representing the "Burmese variety" of the dialectical method, and with the "avoidance of extremes"--the central idea of this concept. For example, when they analyze the theory of perception (1980, No 10), they say that the tendencies to draw conclusions only from practice or only from theory are two extremes which must be avoided. In their opinion, the confusion of relative information with complete and absolute knowledge on the one hand, and the refusal to accept absolute knowledge (or truth) on the other, are also two extremes.

Therefore, the concept of the "middle path"--the characteristic philosophical interpretation of contemporary Burmese social thought--has indisputable similarities to social thought in the contemporary East as a whole.

Let us take a look at the most characteristic features of the material reviewed.

1. The exposition of party doctrine in these articles corresponds in general to the original letter of the doctrine and to the form in which it was presented in policy-planning documents of the 1960's, although some matters are only mentioned in brief while others--as, for example, the concepts of the "three worlds" and the "middle path"--are discussed in much greater detail than in the original documents. Another matter which is described in detail and is regarded by Burmese ideologists as a quite important one is the connection between mind and matter, particularly the spiritual ("spirit" or "reason") and corporeal elements of the human being. In our opinion the authors of these articles were unable to surmount the dualism inherent in the acceptance of these "principles" as equal (1982, Nos 1-5).

At the same time, the authors of these articles paid little attention to matters concerning BSPP views on the history of human society and the history of socialist ideas. In "The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment," however, this subject matter took up three-quarters of the entire text and included many of the premises of scientific socialism.

2. There is an obvious emphasis in all of the articles on the distinctly Burmese features of ruling party ideology. This is quite evident in the analysis of the term "tabotaya," in the use of "Buddhisisms" and in the attempt to synthesize Buddhist and non-Buddhist ideas, particularly the "middle path" and dialectics. The articles contain direct references to this.

Describing party ideology, the authors write: "This ideology is a specifically Burmese ideology which includes ideas developed during the history of the world socialist movement and Burmese customs and cultural traditions--everything suited to the Burmese society" (1980, No 11). Another article (1981, No 3) begins with an indicative appraisal of the "1962 revolution": This was, they write, "Burma's return to the path of Aun San." This path presupposes, the authors go on to say, the elaboration of the appropriate ideology ("tabotaya") suited to the Burmese society and consistent with Burmese customs. The practice of simply "copying ideas" from abroad, they stress, would be abnormal, "unnatural," "devoid of any promise for the future and conducive to degeneration."

3. The thesis of the specifically Burmese features is connected with another important fact: The source of the genuine Burmese spirit, its uniqueness and its purity is declared to be the people--the not precisely differentiated masses to whom the populist Burmese ideologists began appealing in 1962. Party ideology, the authors of these articles maintain--and this reflects the official point of view--corresponds to Burmese ideals precisely because it is essentially populist and derives its ideological constructs from popular tradition.

4. Whenever possible, general aspects of theory are connected with facts from contemporary Burmese reality in these articles; the authors frequently repeat that the main purpose of party ideology is "to serve as a guide for action in the construction of a socialist society."

The "practical" emphasis is also apparent in the authors' examination of possibilities for the correction of some ideological premises in accordance with changing events. This is made all the more important by the definite changes that occurred in the 1970's, particularly the shift in the Burmese leadership's economic policy toward "liberalization," which gave the private sector more freedom, stimulated foreign economic ties and placed more emphasis on "market" methods of state regulation. On the whole, there was some relaxation of statist and autarchic aims in economics, and even in politics to some degree. Were these changes reflected in ideology?

Party ideology, the authors of one article write (1981, No 1), is based not only on accumulated knowledge, but also on its verification in practice. Otherwise, "this would be futile knowledge." Some people, the authors go on to say, regard ideology ("tabotaya") as "a line of reasoning separate from real life, something like the science of opinions." This, according to the BSPP, is a false and mistaken idea. Ideology is actually engendered by real life and verified by it. Furthermore, life is constantly changing, and ideology ("tabotaya") changes along with it. One article contains the following quotation from the BSPP Charter: "Thoughts, ideas, theories, remarks, written compositions, calculations, formulas and so forth are significant only in relation to a specific time, place and set of circumstances.... Since everything is constantly changing, they (thoughts, ideas, etc.) must be encouraged to undergo corresponding changes and improvements in line with the new time, place and set of circumstances.... If the BSPP should encounter more progressive ideas, political aims and methods meeting Burmese requirements while

traveling the 'Burmese path to socialism,' it will welcome these innovations and implement them.

Therefore, changes in ideology are acknowledged to be acceptable, and even necessary in some cases. This seems noteworthy to us.

Another point has also undergone an important change. In the article examining the place of man--"the most perfect and intelligent being"--in the world (1981, No 1), just as in the original documents, man is regarded as the center of the universe, the focal point of all "three worlds." But he is regarded as more of an observer than a creator. It is the job of man to understand the natural laws of nature and society and act in accordance with them. The Lanzin party studies nature and society and places their laws above its activity (and not vice versa), thereby making it "more natural" (we should recall the tendency to link the term "tabotaya" with "natural law," "law of nature" and so forth), and this is a guarantee of its success. The main thing is not change, but adaptation to it. In our opinion, all of the articles in question are permeated with the spirit of this idea. During the first years of the regime's existence, on the other hand, there was an emphasis on man's active intervention in the course of history, on action and on conscious transforming activity.

The replacement of vigorous activism and even the definitely voluntarist tendencies of the first years with more moderate aims, corresponding to objective reality and essentially related to the traditional philosophy, seems to us to be a characteristic feature of the evolution of the non-capitalist Burmese regime's ideology; in essence, it consists in an "optimization" of the model of development which does not depart from fundamental conceptual principles but is nevertheless based on a more realistic and balanced approach with a view to objective conditions. It is from this standpoint that the heightened interest in the concept of the "middle path," presupposing equidistance from extremes as the deciding principle of development, should apparently be interpreted.

FOOTNOTES

1. Although we realize that the differences between the views of the ruling group and their explicit expression can be quite significant in some cases, and although we recognize the need to analyze these differences, we nevertheless believe that official publications provide a generally accurate reflection of the most significant ideas and their actual evolution.
5. Pali terminology was incorporated in the Burmese language when Buddhism spread through the country and it performed the functions of a philosophical language. There was no other philosophical system or philosophical language in precolonial Burma.
6. Ne Win, *Op. cit.*, p 221.

7. This translation does not appear in the articles; we took it from "The System of Correlation of Man and His Environment" (1963)--see footnote 4. The official English translation of the document contained precisely this identification.
8. See G. Ol'denberg, "Budda. Yego zhizn', ucheniye i obshchina" [Buddha. His Life, Teachings and Community], Moscow, 1891, pp 99-100.
9. MYANMA SOSHELI LANZIN PATI TABOTAYA YEYA, Rangoon, July 1970, No 5, p 91.
10. The word used here is the same as the word in the phrase "movement for nonalignment."
11. This is another echo of Buddhist canonical texts, in which the lute is used as an allegorical image: It will not play if the strings are too slack or too taut.

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CURRENT STAGE IN STUDY AND INTERPRETATION OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 151-169

[Article by A. I. Kobzev]

[Excerpts] The purpose of this survey is the elucidation of some new trends in the definition, interpretation and appraisal of the massive cultural phenomenon in Chinese history which Western and Soviet authors usually call Neo-Confucianism.

If we discuss the spatial framework of Neo-Confucianism rather than time periods, it must be said that it has become a fundamental cultural phenomenon in the entire Far East, and not only in China. The outstanding Chinese historian and philosopher Chan Wing-tsit takes this fact into account in his general description of Neo-Confucianism: "The history of Neo-Confucianism is essentially the history of contemporary Chinese philosophy. It has dominated not only Chinese thinking in the last 800 years, but also Japanese thinking for many centuries. In China Neo-Confucianism went through three stages of development: the school of principle during the Sung period (960-1279), the school of spirit in the Ming period (1368-1644) and the empirical school in the Ch'ing period (1644-1911). In Japan it was represented by the school of Shushi (Zhu Xi) and the school of Oyomei (Wang Yangming)."¹⁵ Chan Wing-tsit sees Neo-Confucianism not as an intellectual relic, but as the foundation of contemporary Chinese philosophy, although he does admit that it has been pushed into the background in 20th-century China by Western philosophical currents--pragmatism, materialism, neo-realism, vitalism and the new idealism.¹⁶

7.2. One of the first consistent sociological interpretations of Neo-Confucianism was attempted by T. de Bary, who proceeded from the thesis that traditional Chinese thinking could be understood in the light of the parallel study of institutional history. Acknowledging that the Sung era was a unique period in terms of the scope and diversity of intellectual life, T. de Bary says: "Nevertheless, despite the tendency of Neo-Confucianism under the last dynasties to regard ethical and metaphysical questions as the only ones worthy of attention, it is a fact that the Confucians in power tried to solve problems in administration, and outstanding unofficial authors were challenged by these problems."⁵⁰ The American Sinologist also looked to the sphere of social institutions for an explanation of the viability of Neo-Confucianism, which still exists even today. The leaders of this movement, in his opinion,

took a lively interest in vital issues of human existence and in immediate social objectives. Since the main problems and institutions of Chinese society existed for centuries, Neo-Confucianism never lost its pertinence. On the whole, T. de Bary interprets the Neo-Confucian tradition as "more of a lifestyle, state of mind, character type or vague spiritual ideal than a definite code of morality or philosophical system."⁵¹ In the same way, A. M. Ushkev proposes that Confucianism be viewed as a way of life rather than as a philosophy, code of ethics or religion.⁵²

7.3. This excessively sociological approach could lead to the definition of Neo-Confucianism as an ideology of the patriarchal order.⁵³ Of course, this definition can explain the viability of Neo-Confucianism, but it contributes little to an understanding of its philosophical essence.

7.4. Besides this, there is also an opposite sociological trend, revealing progressive features in Neo-Confucianism rather than conservative patriarchal ones. Swiss Sinologist J. F. Billeter's book about Li Zhi is a recent example of the consistent use of this approach within the context of ideas about the Chinese Renaissance.⁵⁴ His general views on the birth and evolution of Neo-Confucianism are the following. The dominant class in Chinese society from the 11th through the 19th centuries was the Mandarin class, or the Mandarinate. Just as it is impossible to understand the history of Chinese society in the 11th-19th centuries without an understanding of the history of the Mandarinate, it is impossible to understand the Mandarinate without an understanding of its ideology--Neo-Confucianism. "Neo-Confucianism is among the most monumental ruins in the intellectual history of mankind. This cannot be ignored and the Mandarin society can no longer be described exclusively in economic terms--its ideology was an integral part, and even the central part, of its economy."⁵⁵ Although this ideology was restricted to a class which was open and simultaneously openly privileged, it nevertheless, in J. F. Billeter's opinion, reflected universal reason. The key link was the system of state examinations, signifying that symbolic capital--that is, knowledge and moral qualities--was of greater value in society than economic capital. What is more, it was easily converted into the latter.

The Mandarin concept of the absolutely rational universe collapsed in 1279, when the empire was conquered by the Mongols. "In response to this massive invasion, the irrational segment of the Mandarinate took a strikingly irrational position, representing the opposite of (rational--A. K.) Mandarin universalism."⁵⁶ Under the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty (13th-14th centuries), the Mandarinate ceased to be the dominant class in all spheres and became a politically dependent and ideologically powerless class of landowners. By the same token, Neo-Confucianism lost its primary *raison d'être*. Other social forces, particularly commercial capital, underwent active development at this time. When a national dynasty began to rule the country again a century later, at the beginning of the Ming era, Neo-Confucianism took on an authoritarian nature. This stemmed, firstly, from its desire to quickly regain lost influence, primarily with the aid of antimerchantism, and, secondly, from its status as an official ideology copying the authoritarian features of the imperial authorities using it. Besides this, since these authorities already expressed the interests of more than just the Mandarinate, intellectual opposition to the official ideology began to take shape in this class: "little by little, the authoritarian

state Confucianism began to be opposed by personal Confucianism aimed only at personal asceticism and a search for wisdom for its own sake, wisdom not connected with any political goals."⁵⁷ The gap between this spiritual quest and official Confucianism was revealed with absolute clarity in the works of Wang Yangming, who became the central figure in the history of Neo-Confucianism of the Ming era. As for official Neo-Confucianism, it continued to be distinguished by authoritarian antimerchantism.

Although J. F. Billeter begins by viewing Neo-Confucianism as a strong social determinant, he eventually moves in the opposite direction and reduces the basic stages of its evolution to radical social changes.

8. Although T. Metzger fully acknowledged the significance of the social context, he criticized T. de Bary's idea that the highest Neo-Confucian ideals, paradigms of the ideal way of life, were "inexpressible" and resolved to disclose its philosophical model and "metaphysical superstructure." In this he agreed with the general viewpoint of prominent Chinese philosophers and philosophy historians living outside the PRC, principally Tang Junyi and Mou Zongsan. Therefore, we are dealing here with a unique case of the denial of a denial, or a return to the definition of the spiritual essence of Neo-Confucianism on a new level, with a view to the social context.

8.1. Of course, it must be said that the spiritual essence was never forgotten. Only the estimates of its significance for Neo-Confucianism as an integral historical and cultural phenomenon changed, along with the degree to which related problems were examined. In particular, T. de Bary cited a fairly meager set of characteristics of Neo-Confucianism as a group of spiritual theories.⁵⁸ The two first characteristics--or, as he called them, general tendencies--were specifically inherent in Neo-Confucianism, but the three last were only slightly more typical of Neo-Confucianism than of all Confucianism.

In the first place, Neo-Confucianism is distinguished by fundamentalism--that is, the statement of Confucius' fundamental postulates in their original form and in the capacity of self-evident truths requiring no validation or reinterpretation in light of subsequent intellectual development (this approach was already clearly evident in the works of Han Yu).

In the second place, Neo-Confucianism is distinguished by restorationism or revivalism--that is, the admission that existing sociopolitical conditions inhibit the establishment of Confucian ideals and consequently must be changed and brought more closely in line with the conditions of antiquity. This is the reason for the slogan "fu gu"--"return to antiquity"--and the emphasis on precepts recorded in the ancient canon "Li ji" ("Notes on the Rules of Propriety").

Neo-Confucianism is distinguished by a greater degree of the following than all Confucianism: 1) humanism, 2) rationalism, 3) historical-mindedness.

As for humanism, here the teachings of Confucius himself were focused on man and his place in society, and not on the supernatural or on divine law. In Neo-Confucianism this emphasis on the individual and society is contrasted to

the Buddhist and Taoist view of the world, presupposing its indifference to human values and the fate of society. This was demonstrated more specifically when all of the Neo-Confucian schools recognized human nature as something essentially good and thereby drew a clear distinction between themselves and the Buddhists.

In this case, rationalism does not mean the conscious resistance of faith or intuition, but it presupposes three facts: 1) The world is an orderly entity consisting of balanced parts; 2) man is capable of recognizing the order lying behind chaotic things and events; 3) there must be systematic study of "things" (that is, people, their institutions, their history and their classical works; the Chinese concept "wu"--"thing-object"--includes man) and the accumulation of knowledge so that the person can become "jun zi"--a noble person--and thereby find a balance between himself and the world in his life. Here Neo-Confucianism was also inconsistent with Buddhism, which asserted the absence of any kind of substance lying behind things and considered them to be ephemeral, and moral law to be ephemeral, because the world is nothing. The interest in things, on the other hand, signifies that "the seeds of a certain variety of empiricism were inherent in Confucian rationalism."⁵⁹

Historical-mindedness is closely related to the general ethical nature of Confucianism. The order the Neo-Confucians found in the world was ultimately more moral than rational and it surmounted Buddhist skepticism and nihilism. For this reason, this variety of rationalism was in the service of historical research and the improvement of practice. Chinese historians "always regarded history as a guide to moral and political action and never, as far as I know," T. de Bary wrote, "believed that it was valuable in itself, just as they did not strive for neutrality or objectivity superceding all doctrinal premises."⁶⁰

The small number of characteristics of the Neo-Confucian "spiritual model" in T. de Bary's theory is logically connected with the idea that Neo-Confucianism was distinguished by intellectual breadth and was not of a compulsory nature. This was reflected specifically in the assimilation of Buddhist and Taoist ideas and the tolerance for diverging opinion. According to T. de Bary, the well-known cases of the repression of dissident opinion by official Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism were the result not of doctrinal differences, but primarily of dissident actions against the existing political order.⁶¹

11. Mou Zongsan's ideas about the high spiritual value of Neo-Confucianism as an integral philosophical system, including its religious aspect, were amplified by Tu Wei-ming in his works, particularly his last book, "Humanity and Self-Cultivation." As a man with a Confucian education, he openly declared his belief in the ideals of this doctrine and tried to substantiate their universal value. Tu Wei-ming was aware of the negative features of the Confucian influence on the traditional and contemporary Chinese state--despotism, gerontocracy, etc. Nevertheless, in spite of the inclination of the majority of Chinese intellectuals and Western Sinologists of the last half-century or so to underscore the negative aspects of Confucianism, he strived to reveal the valuable humanitarian essence of this doctrine, the central aspect of which, in his opinion is man's total self-cultivation and self-realization--that is, the process by which man becomes wise.

The constant attempts of contemporary Chinese reformists to subject the Confucian heritage to reappraisal testify, according to Tu Wei-ming, that it does not represent meaningless dead weight to them. And it was precisely the problem of cultural unity that was the stumbling-block for them. Unable to solve this problem, reformists put forth various "miracle-working" plans, and when these failed they diminished faith in the ideological validity of political authority. This "vacuum" was quickly filled by brute force, which radically changed the image of the country that had been a state of "ritual and music" for centuries. Tu Wei-ming recalls that, according to J. Levenson, the politicization of culture became Confucian China's ill fate. But the fate of Confucianism has not been decided yet. "On the contrary, there is a real possibility that Confucian thought could be revived as the dominant intellectual force in China."⁷² Only the genuine depoliticization of culture can restore the broad influence of Confucian values in art, literature, history and philosophy.

In his book, Tu Wei-ming wanted to demonstrate the contemporary implications of traditional problems in Confucian and, in particular, Neo-Confucian ideology, but this was most clearly demonstrated in the author's analysis of the living continuation of Confucian thought in our day. According to the American Sinologist, its outstanding spokesman was Xiong Shili, a philosophy historian and philosopher who lived in the PRC, was famous outside the country as one of the greatest and most original Chinese thinkers of the 20th century and had more followers there than Feng Yulan and Liang Shuming. Although he was also a consistent and persistent critic of Chinese communism, he did not, in contrast to many of his colleagues, indulge in ostentatious self-criticism and the denial of his own views. The crisis of the Chinese society and state in the 20th century gave rise to the belief that the main culprit in this was Confucian ideology. Even those with the most favorable attitudes toward Confucianism were inclined to recognize only its historical value. Xiong Shili, on the other hand, tried to point up the universal import of this doctrine and to examine the eternal problems of human existence in this ideological context. In contrast to Hu Shi, perhaps the most brilliant representative of the May 4th generation, who tried to express Chinese problems in Western philosophical terms, Xiong Shili tried to assess Western achievements from the standpoint of Confucian humanism. Furthermore, Xiong Shili was concerned with the ontological viewpoint and philosophical anthropology of the Confucian tradition rather than with its historical, religious, sociological or cultural implications. The thinker's certainty that China's revitalization would be impossible without a reconstruction of its cultural foundation was based on the recognition of the Confucian principle--which was most consistently promoted by the Neo-Confucian Wang Yangming--of the "unity of knowledge and action," in accordance with which perception was an active pursuit and not simply passive contemplation.

In his discussion of the state of Confucian ideology in light of the "Cultural Revolution" and subsequent events in the PRC, Tu Wei-ming concluded that Confucian and Neo-Confucian ideals and values represent the best means of solving contemporary China's main problems, particularly the need to adapt to today's world without losing its own cultural continuity. "Maoism as such," Tu Wei-ming said, was fundamentally hostile to Confucianism, but it could not

remove the country from the "Confucian jurisdiction" and the sense of this failure caused its ideologists to fear an invasion by Confucian "spirits and demons." Although Confucian symbolism as a whole is no longer intact in China, Confucian ideas have continued to represent "the tenacious reality of the past and a viable alternative for the future."⁷⁹ In general, Zhang Junmai's work reflects a similar point of view.

11.1. T. de Bary finds much more modest but equally positive Neo-Confucian features of value to present-day culture, including Western culture. First of all, he believes that lessons can be derived for the resolution of the political administrative problems of the contemporary highly developed society, primarily problems in government service, standards of competence, bureaucracy, legality, the struggle against corruption and factionalism and economic control. Secondly, noting the revival of ideals of family solidarity, service to the family and family life, T. de Bary believes that Confucian and Neo-Confucian analyses of this subject matter might be pertinent at the present time.⁸⁰

11.2. At the same time, the popular view of Neo-Confucianism as a purely negative phenomenon is still present in Western literature. It is substantiated primarily with reference to the sociopolitical underdevelopment of China as a result of Neo-Confucian ideological premises. The authors who share this view are inclined to compare and contrast China's Neo-Confucian values to the Protestant ethic, or the "philosophy of stinginess" (as B. Franklin called it), in the West, which inspired its capitalist development. They proceed from the belief that "human egotism and selfish motives are acknowledged to be the driving force and cornerstone of the Western capitalist system. The Western nations, particularly America, owe their material abundance largely to this spirit, as preached by its apostles--Adam Smith, Malthus, Marshall and others of this type."⁸¹ The Neo-Confucians who gave Confucianism its final form as ideological baggage determining the appearance of the Chinese nationality, on the other hand, consciously contrasted their highest values--humanity, virtue and truth--to advantage, economic profit, money and wealth. This preaching discouraged the accumulation of goods of material value and prevented economic development. The figure of the entrepreneur--the main hero of the era of capitalist industrial development--never appeared in traditional China. This caused the "spoilage" of "human capital," reinforced by the canonized Neo-Confucian system of education based on the study of antimerchant texts and excluding commercial, biological and engineering courses. According to Cheng Shujung, the Neo-Confucian ideal, and the Confucian one in general, placed moral satisfaction above financial prosperity and was therefore "quite different from the contemporary Marxist and capitalist doctrines."⁸²

11.3. There is a definite contradiction here, however. When Cheng Shujung speaks of Neo-Confucianism's colossal influence on the life of the Chinese people and the policy of their government, he says that the Confucian Analects are still an essential element of the curriculum in higher education and the basis of all state examinations in Taiwan. But after all, this has not been an insurmountable obstacle to Taiwan's fairly successful industrial development according to the capitalist model. T. de Bary cited a similar argument in 1959 against J. Fairbank's theory, when he blamed the "bankruptcy" of contemporary China on the collapse of the Confucian social and political order.

T. de Bary said that Confucianism, as an intellectual force and ethical system in its Neo-Confucian interpretation, could secure the successful modernization of Japan, where the leaders of the "Meiji Restoration" adhered to the motto: "Eastern (that is, Confucian) ethics, Western science."⁸³

11.4. On the whole, the role of Neo-Confucianism has also been the target of extremely harsh criticism in the PRC. Just as in the West, the attacks have concentrated on its sociopolitical implications, which, according to Ren Jiyu, Yang Xiangkui, Ding Weizhi and others,⁸⁴ inhibited progressive thought and social progress.

Just as in the West, but naturally in a more cautious form, some scholars in the PRC, such as Qiu Hansheng, Wang Jian and Zhou Lisheng, have found positive aspects of Neo-Confucianism, progressive for their time and of some use in our day, and precisely in its philosophical premises (for example, the analysis of the relationship between the subject and the object).⁸⁵

12. In summation, we can say quite definitely that world Sinology is still far from a more or less unanimous view on Neo-Confucianism, despite the abundance of general and specific studies of this topic. In Soviet Sinology there is no developed theory dealing specifically with Neo-Confucianism, but this could facilitate the assessment of the latest overseas research findings in this area, findings which have seriously changed traditional ideas about Neo-Confucianism. The timely and discerning interpretation of these results is needed in the historical fields of Sinology (social history, cultural history, the history of philosophy, the history of science, etc.), and also in the accurate assessment of the present-day implications of Neo-Confucian theory and practice in China and some adjacent states.

FOOTNOTES

15. Chan Wing-tsit, "The Story of Chinese Philosophy,"--"The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture," Honolulu, 1967, p 57.
16. Ibid., p 67.
49. The vague idea of the Chinese Renaissance has long been reflected in Western Sinological literature. See, for example: St. Le Gall, "Le philosophe Zhou Hi, sa doctrine, son influence," Shanghai, 1894, p 3; Hu Shih, "The Chinese Renaissance," Chicago, 1934.
50. W. Th. de Bary, "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism--Studies in Chinese Thought," Chicago, 1953, p 82.
51. "The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism," edited by W. Th. de Bary, N.Y., 1975, p 24.
52. A. M. Ushkov, Op. cit., pp 37-38.
53. Qiu Hansheng, "Song Ming li zue yu zongfa sixiang" (The Doctrine of Principle Under the Sung and Ming [Dynasties] and the Patriarchal Ideology), LISHI YANJIU, 1979, No 11.

54. J. F. Billeter, "Li Zhi, philosophe maudit (1527-1602). Contribution a une sociologie du mandarinat chinois de la fin des Ming," Geneva, 1979. Also see our review of this book in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, 1981, No 3, pp 218-225.
55. J. F. Billeter, Op. cit., p 92.
56. Ibid., p 91.
57. Ibid., p 93.
58. W. Th. de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism--Confucianism in Action," Stanford, 1959, pp 34-35, 38-43.
59. Ibid., p 40. Compare to N. I. Konrad's statement: "In Zhu Xi's concept of theoretical perception, rationalism is united with empiricism and not contrasted to it" (Op. cit., p 190) and Tu Wei-ming's belief that Neo-Confucianism "always placed experimental knowledge above speculative theories" ("The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism," p 523).
60. W. Th. de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," p 43.
61. Ibid., p 29.
72. Tu Wei-ming, "Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought," Berkeley, 1979, p XVIII.
79. Ibid., p 285.
80. W. Th. de Bary, "A Reappraisal of Neo-Confucianism," p 83; idem., "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," p 49.
81. Chen Shujung Benjamin, "Confucianism and the Backwardness of China's Economy: A Study of Human Self-Interest and the Profit-Seeking Motive in Relation to Economic Development," ASIAN PROFILE, 1979, vol 7, No 6, p 508.
82. Ibid., p 514.
83. W. Th. de Bary, "Some Common Tendencies in Neo-Confucianism," pp 25-28.
84. See, for example, Ding Weizhi, "The Transformations of Confucianism," LISHI YANJIU, 1979, No 12.
85. Liu Hongzhang, Op. cit., p 82.

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INTELLIGENTSIA AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN DEVELOPING ASIAN AND AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Moscow NARODY AZII I AFRIKI in Russian No 6, Nov-Dec 83 (signed to press 16 Nov 83) pp 170-174

[Review by I. V. Podberezskiy of book "Intelligentsiya i sotsial'nyy progress v razvivayushchikhsya stranakh Azii i Afriki" by A. G. Bel'skiy, Yu. N. Gavrilov, L. V. Geveling, Ye. V. Golubeva, L. M. Demin, B. S. Yerasov, N. S. Illarionov, G. F. Kim, V. N. Kirpichenko, A. I. Kravtsevich, T. F. Kryuchkova, A. I. Kuprin, T. I. Kukhtina, B. A. Lapshov, V. F. Li, V. M. Mazurov, V. I. Maksimenko, A. N. Moseyko, L. R. Polonskaya, S. I. Potabenko, Ye. B. Rashkovskiy, A. I. Samsonova, L. A. Fridman, V. G. Khoros, V. V. Chernovskaya and N. B. Shuvalova, editor-in-chief V. F. Li, Moscow, Glavnaya redaktsiya vostochnoy literatury, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1981, 328 pages (Developmental Paths of Newly Liberated Eastern Countries)]

[Excerpts] The best method of combating an ideological enemy consists in the elaboration of a theory of one's own. This is axiomatic, but the publication of a new work corroborating this axiom is a nonetheless satisfying event. We believe that this satisfaction will be felt by each Orientalist who reads this book.

The question of the role and place of the intelligentsia in the life of developing countries is one of the most vital and, it must be said, complex and confused issues of our day. Marxist analysis of this matter is essential, and the analysis offered by these authors is an indisputably valuable contribution to Oriental studies. By raising the issue of "the intelligentsia and social progress" in the title of the book, the authors also defined their approach--the class features inherent in the nature of the intelligentsia (and its intellectual leanings) and its role in the social development of newly liberated countries traveling the road from national to social liberation. Social liberation and social progress depend on the objectively determined correlation of class forces in these countries and in the world, but the subjective factor, which includes the realization of this correlation, also plays an important part. The realization and expression (their accuracy or innaccuracy is another matter) of ongoing social processes are the function of the intelligentsia, which it is obligated to perform by virtue of its status, even if only with varying degrees of success.

All of the complex and contradictory features of the intelligentsia's status in the developing countries are described well in this work. The authors'

main methodological principle--their class approach--allows them to draw distinctions between matters of primary and secondary significance and to avoid trivial conclusions.

The structure of the work as a whole is balanced and logical. The "Introduction" contains a precise description of all the problems that are then solved in the rest of the work. The division of the work into five sections shows noteworthy foresight. Various important aspects of the activity of the intelligentsia--this substantial element of the social-class structure of multileveled Asian and African countries--are discussed in each of these sections.

Section I deals with the origins of the intelligentsia, its composition and its position in the social structure of developing countries. The first chapter--dealing with problems in the study of the intelligentsia--is of an introductory nature and pertains to the entire book than only to the first section, and it therefore should have prefaced the entire study. It contains an analysis of basic concepts, defines the intelligentsia as a separate social stratum and--in amplification of the "Introduction"--clarifies the research objectives. The chapter on the origins of the intelligentsia is distinguished by thoroughness and originality. Its author (V. I. Maksimenko) sees the roots of the intelligentsia in the conflict between two civilizations, but quite correctly views the appearance of this stratum as "the native society's opposition to colonialism in all of its direct and indirect forms" (p 32).

The merits of the work include the use of concepts (particularly the concept of "intellectual potential," the title of the third chapter) that were not used widely in the social sciences until recently. Abundant information is skillfully combined with generalizations in Chapter 3. As for intellectual potential, its definition should also have been given: It is hardly likely that the entire matter can be reduced to the number of specialists with degrees. Besides this, the quality of education in the developing countries should have been discussed.

The intelligentsia's role in the sociopolitical struggle is the subject of Part II. It contains conclusive evidence of the socially determined nature of political activity by the intelligentsia and the futility of attempts to "rise above the struggle" (p 99). The conclusion regarding an obviously negative tendency in the intelligentsia's behavior--the attempts to gain sociopolitical privileges--is of theoretical and practical significance (p 100). The authors also draw the important conclusion that "when the intelligentsia has been in power, it has had to act according to a different logic--the logic of social domination" (p 95). Chapter 5 deals with some of the same subject matter as Chapter 4: "The Intelligentsia in the Structure of Government and in the Sociopolitical Struggle" and "The Intelligentsia's Participation in Politics in the Eastern Countries" (what happened to Africa in the latter case is not quite clear). Part II also deals with problems in the political mobilization of the masses (some authors prefer to use the term "politicization"--see p 159), the inclusion of part of the intelligentsia in the "ruling elite" (p 143), the intelligentsia's relationship with revolutionary democrats and its participation in vanguard parties.

Part III, consisting of four chapters dealing with the intelligentsia and ideological currents, is exceptionally important. It begins with a detailed description of the basic features of the Afro-Asian intelligentsia's ideological evolution and then offers a system for the classification of ideologies elaborated and supported by the intelligentsia: liberal reformism, populism and revolutionary democracy. The choice depends on the class interests expressed by various segments of the intelligentsia. Chapter 7 contains a description of the intelligentsia's major philosophical currents: nationalism, enlightenment, populism and socialism. There is the important stipulation that in the developing countries this is often socialism of the non-Marxist, pre-scientific type (p 166). In general, the extremes of intellectual thought in the developing countries are described well: nationalism and universalism, traditionalism and modernism, and humanism and technocracy. The extremes of democratism and socialism are discussed less successfully (p 173). It is true that the author (V. G. Khoros) stipulates that he is referring to (petty) bourgeois democratism, but it would still be more accurate to say that socialist democratism is the opposite of this (petty) bourgeois variety, particularly since the same author discusses the matter in approximately the same terms on page 203. The intelligentsia's attitude toward religious tradition is analyzed briefly, but not at the cost of profundity. Three types of ideological currents using religious dogma are described: traditional ideology, modernization and synthesis. This discussion reveals the contradictory nature of modernizing theories, which can be used in the interest of the bourgeoisie but sometimes emphasize an anti-exploitation interpretation of various religious principles (p 180).

In the sections pertaining to ideological currents, chapters dealing with populism and the attitude of the revolutionary-democratic intelligentsia toward scientific socialism are particularly noteworthy. The social roots of populist views and their special appeal to the intelligentsia are analyzed in detail and, what is most important, their internal connection with the Russian variety of populism is traced. The intelligentsia's choice of the peasantry as its referent group is carefully substantiated (p 205). The experience of the countries choosing real socialism is an important part of Chapter 10, which describes the complex and sometimes contradictory process of the assimilation of Marxism-Leninism by the progressive Afro-Asian intelligentsia. This section contains the accurate remark that the need for this no longer stems from "the desire for political sovereignty, but the need to solve the majority of complex social, economic and cultural problems in the interest of the laboring public" (p 213).

In Part IV, "The Intelligentsia and Culture," three issues are raised: the distinctive features of the artistic intelligentsia, its origins and, finally, the intelligentsia and culture in the Eastern countries under the conditions of technological revolution (in the latter case Africa was forgotten again). The "problem field" of the spiritual culture of Afro-Asian society and its internal tension due to the intermediary status of the intelligentsia and the gaps between the elite and the masses and between ideas and realities are defined precisely in Chapter 11 (pp 225-226). The often agonizing process of giving up illusions about the "progressive" role of the Western nations and the tension-ridden search, which is also often agonizing, for uniqueness are

traced. This search often leads to the idealization and cultivation of archaic elements and becomes part of conservative nationalism (p 234). As one author (V. S. Yerasov) comments, "a problem of colossal importance in the sphere of culture is the question of how the cultural material stored in the collective memory of the people can be used to enter the modern age and how certain contemporary elements can be included in the new national culture" (p 239). A system is also offered for the classification of the main directions of sociocultural activity by the intelligentsia in the newly liberated countries: neo-traditionalism, reformism, leftist extremism and revolutionary democracy.

A chapter dealing with the new artistic intelligentsia is an organic component of part IV. The contradictory nature of the effects of the technological revolution on the developing countries is pointed out in Chapter 13. The technological revolution contains a humanizing and objectively democratizing tendency, but there is also a countertendency reflected in the conditions of capitalist development: the concentration of power, the growth of militarism and the "technologization" of everyday social relations (p 262). The socio-cultural changes evoked by the technological revolution can lead to dramatic collisions, but these have creative potential because they point up "the need to establish a culture which does not discard or denigrate national tradition but can be consistent with contemporary worldwide historical requirements and take the experience of other nations into account" (p 268).

The final section, Part V, consists of two chapters: "The Training of Afro-Asian Intellectual Personnel in the Social Strategy of Neocolonialism" and "Criticism of Bourgeois Theories About the 'Social Prominence' of the Intelligentsia in the Development of the Newly Liberated Countries." The first contains a detailed analysis of the far from selfless efforts of major imperialist powers to train personnel for the developing countries. This activity, as the authors of the chapter point out, is also used as a weapon in the inter-imperialist struggle. The last chapter is of crucial importance and is an apt conclusion for the entire study: Criticism is much more convincing after the positive exposition of the Marxist approach to the subject of the intelligentsia.

In the "Conclusion," the authors summarize the results of their research and conclude that "the most farsighted segments of the Afro-Asian intelligentsia can, with the backing of the broad masses, play an even more significant role in the revolutionary struggle for genuine national liberation and social progress in the future" (p 307). This conclusion is irrefutable; it warns against a decline of interest in this matter and essentially promises the reader future works on the important and extremely interesting topic of the intelligentsia's role and place in the developing countries.

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CSO: 1807/122

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